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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to U.C.A. 
§78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVffiW 
I. Issue. Whether it was unlawful for Summit County to tax at full market 
value A.E. Inc.'s real property in the absence of an application by A.E. Inc. 
showing proof that it qualified for the residential property tax exemption. 
Standard of Review and Supporting Authority. The trial court's ruling 
should be reviewed for correctness because this case presents only questions 
of law. S.S. v. State. 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1998). (Record at 70-
73-Addendum, Tab 2.) 
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II. Issue. Whether the statute of limitations bars recovery by A.E. Inc. of all 
taxes it paid under protest over four years prior to filing its complaint on 
December 22, 1999, regardless of when any steps toward an administrative 
remedy were taken. Standard of Review and Supporting Authority. The trial 
court's ruling should be reviewed for correctness because this case presents 
only questions of law. S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1998). 
(Record at 190-192-Addendum of Appellant 18 at pages 14-16.) 
III. Issue. Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to how the A.E. 
Inc. property was used from 1992-1996, thus precluding a favorable 
summary judgment ruling for A.E. Inc.. Standard of Review and Supporting 
Authority. The trial court's ruling should be reviewed for correctness 
because this case presents only questions of law. S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 
439, 440-41 (Utah 1998). (Record at 104-Addendum, Tab 3; Record at 
140-Addendum, Tab 5.) 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Constitution, Art. XIII, §2, subsection (8): 
The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of not 
to exceed 45% of the fair market value of residential property as defined by 
law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclusively 
by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for himself 
and family. 
U.C.A. §59-2-103(2): 
Beginning January 1, 1995, the fair market value of residential property shall 
be reduced by 45 %, representing a residential exemption allowed under Utah 
Constitutional Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. 
U.C.A. §59-2-102(27): 
"Residential property," for the purposes of the reductions and adjustments 
under this chapter, means any property used for residential purposes as a 
primary residence. It does not include property used for transient residential 
use or condominiums used in rental pools. 
U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3): 
No reduction may be made in the value of property and no exemption may be 
granted unless the party affected or the party's agent makes and files with the 
board a written application for the reduction or exemption, verified by signed 
statement, and appears before the board and shows facts upon which it is 
claimed the reduction should be made, or exemption granted. The board may 
waive the application or personal appearance requirements. 
Standard of Practice 2.13, Property Tax Administration, Utah Tax Commission: 
Addendum, Tab 1. 
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U.C.A. §59-2-1327: 
Where a tax is demanded or enforced by a taxing entity, and the person 
whose property is taxed claims the tax is unlawful, that person may pay the 
tax under protest to the county treasurer. The person may then bring an 
action in the district court against the officer or taxing entity to recover the 
tax or any portion of the tax paid under protest. 
U.C.A. §78-12-25(3): 
An action may be brought within four years: (3) for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law. 
U.C.A. §78-12-40: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of 
action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he 
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may commence a 
new action within one year after the reversal or failure. 
A STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
A.E. Inc. paid property taxes timely on one improved and on one 
unimproved unit of real property in Summit County at 100% fair market value for 
the years 1992 through 1996. Each of the tax payments was paid under protest to 
the Summit County Treasurer because the assessment each year did not exempt a 
portion of the property as primary residential. A.E. Inc. never filed, in any of the 
tax years, an application providing evidence that the property qualified for the 
9 
primary residential property tax exemption; and, accordingly, Summit County did 
not assess the property as primary residential. A.E. Inc. finally applied for and 
received the exemption in 1997. A.E. Inc.'s request for a refund for 1992 through 
1996 was denied. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
A.E. Inc. filed a complaint in Third District Court, State of Utah, on 
December 22, 1999, alleging unlawful taxation by Summit County under U.C.A. 
§59-12-1327. Summit County answered the complaint and on February 3, 2000, 
motioned the district court for summary judgment. That motion was opposed, a 
cross-motion was filed by A.E. Inc., and then both motions were argued on April 
17, 2000. On May 11, 2000, the district court granted Summit County's motion 
and denied that of A.E. Inc.. The district court found that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact, that A.E. Inc. was not unlawfully taxed because it did not 
file an application as required by U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) and the Tax Commission 
Standards, and that A.E. Inc's claims for 1992 through and including 1995 were 
barred by the Statute of Limitations. (Record at 153-156). 
Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented 
A.E. Inc. is an owner of two units of real property in Deer Valley, Summit 
County, Utah. (Record at 75, 1fl-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 107, ifl-Addendum, 
Tab 3.) For the tax years 1992 through 1996, Unit 7 of A.E. Inc.'s property was 
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assessed as .98 acres of land, improved with a building and Unit 8 of A.E. Inc.'s 
property was assessed as .59 acres of unimproved land. (Record at 75, 
12-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 107, 12-Addendum, Tab 3.) A.E. Inc. filed a 
letter with the Summit County Treasurer in each tax year, 1993 - 1996, asserting 
payment of property taxes under protest. (Record at 75, 13-Addendum, Tab 2; 
Record at 106, 14-Addendum, Tab 3.) A.E. Inc. claims that it should have been 
given a residential property tax exemption for the subject real property for the tax 
years 1992 through 1996. (Record at 75, 14-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 107, 
17-Addendum, Tab 3.) 
A.E. Inc. never filed an application for a residential property tax exemption 
with Summit County, as required by U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), nor did A.E. Inc. ever 
provide any evidence that it qualified for the residential property tax exemption 
during tax years 1992 - 1996. (Record at 75, 15-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 132-
133-Addendum, Tab 4; Record at 155, 14-Addendum of Appellant 14.) A.E. Inc. 
paid its 1995 property taxes on November 30, 1995. (Record at 75, 16-Addendum, 
Tab 2; Record at 106, 15-Addendum, Tab 3.) A.E. Inc.'s property taxes for the 
years 1992 through 1994 were paid before the end of each year they were due. 
(Record at 75, 17-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 106, 16-Addendum, Tab 3.) 
On February 3, 1997, A.E. Inc. submitted an application for residential 
property tax exemption to Summit County. (Record at 74, 18-Addendum, Tab 2; 
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Record at 106, 18-Addendum, Tab 3.) Thereafter, on April 17, 1997, A.E. Inc. 
was granted residential property tax exempt status for tax year 1997 and thereafter. 
(Record at 74, 18-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 106, 19-Addendum, Tab 3.) On 
April 24, 1997, A.E. Inc. filed a request for property tax refund for the tax years 
1992 - 1996. (Record at 91, Addendum, Tab 3.) On August 14, 1997, the Summit 
County Board of Commissioners, sitting as the Board of Equalization, denied A.E. 
Inc.'s request. (Record at 74, 19-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 105, 119-
10-Addendum, Tab 3.) 
Nearly a year later, on July 16, 1998, A.E. Inc. appealed the decision of the 
Board of Equalization to the Utah State Tax Commission. (Record at 74, 
110-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 105, 112-Addendum, Tab 3.) On October 6, 
1999, the Utah State Tax Commission dismissed A.E. Inc.'s petition. (Record at 74, 
111-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 105, 113-Addendum, Tab 3.) A.E. Inc. filed a 
Request for Reconsideration of the dismissal on October 15, 1999, and the Utah 
State Tax Commission denied that request on December 8, 1999. (Record at 74, 
112-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 104-5, 1114-15-Addendum, Tab 3.) A.E. Inc. 
then filed the district court complaint on December 22, 1999. (Record at 25.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A.E. Inc.'s only allegation of unlawful taxation is that it's property was taxed 
at full market value without the benefit of the primary residential property tax 
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exemption. However, A.E. Inc. failed to apply for the exemption as required by 
LLC.A. §59-2-1102(3), which states that, "no exemption may be granted" unless 
an application is filed (emphasis added). Summit County requires the exemption 
application for residential property tax exemptions based on numerous factors. 
First, the application requirement appears in a part of the Property Tax Act 
titled, "Exemptions:" and by stating, "no exemption may be granted" without the 
application, the legislature evidenced an intent that all property tax exemptions be 
subject to the "Exemptions" part. Second, the Tax Commission requires the 
application for the primary residential property tax exemption in it's standards. And 
third, taxation practicalities support the application requirement: exemptions are 
typically applied for because the onus is rightfully on the taxpayer to come forward 
with evidence to support qualifications for an exemption. For all these reasons, this 
Court should affirm the district court's ruling that A.E. Inc.'s property was not 
unlawfully taxed. 
Next, the parties agree that a four year statute of limitations applies to a tax 
payment under protest and that the cause of action begins to run from the date the 
taxes are paid. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's ruling that 
any recovery for the taxes paid under protest for years 1992 through 1995 is barred 
by the statute of limitations. 
A.E. Inc. seems to suggest that a recent Utah Court of Appeals case supports 
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the proposition that an administrative proceeding should be considered an "action" 
which can be "saved" within the meaning of U.C.A. §78-12-40, the "savings 
statute;" such that when the administrative proceeding is dismissed not upon the 
merits, a subsequent action may save the "action" to the district court. A.E. Inc.'s 
cited authority does not support this proposition. Furthermore, A.E. Inc. did not 
bring a timely administrative proceeding which could then be "saved" by the filing 
of the instant complaint. And therefore, no tolling took place and the district court 
was correct in it's statute of limitations ruling. 
Finally, A.E. Inc. asserts a basis for a favorable summary judgment ruling. 
All facts were undisputed on Summit County's motion for summary judgment, but 
as to A.E. Inc.'s claims, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the use of 
A.E. Inc.'s property for years 1992-1996, thus precluding a ruling for A.E. Inc.; 
and therefore, the denial of A.E. Inc.'s motion for summary judgment by the 
district court was correct. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT IT WAS 
NOT UNLAWFUL FOR SUMMIT COUNTY TO TAX A.E. 
INC.'S REAL PROPERTY AT FULL MARKET VALUE 
A.E. Inc. complains that its two units of real property in Deer Valley were 
taxed "unlawfully" pursuant to U.C.A. §59-2-1327 and U.C.A. §59-1-103 for the 
tax years 1992 through 1996. A.E. Inc.'s sole allegation of unlawfulness is that the 
14 
property should have been afforded a primary residential exemption for each of 
those years. In subsection A, Summit County defends the lawfulness of taxing A.E. 
Inc.'s property at 100% fair market value in the absence of an application by A.E. 
Inc. for the primary residential exemption. In subsection B, Summit County 
specifically responds to those sections of the Brief of Appellant, A.E. Inc., dealing 
with the lawfulness of the taxation, and Summit County identifies numerous of A.E. 
Inc's points and authorities that are improperly raised on appeal. 
A. UTAH LAW, TAX COMMISSION RULES, AND 
TAXATION PRACTICALITIES SUPPORT THE 
REQUIREMENT THAT A.E. INC. SHOW 
QUALIFICATIONS FOR A RESIDENTIAL 
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION 
i. UTAH CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES 
Utah Constitution, Art. XIII, §2, subsection (1), states, "All tangible 
property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or under this 
Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to 
be ascertained as provided by law" (emphasis added). An "exempt(ion)... under 
this Constitution" for residential property is delineated later in the same Article and 
section of the Utah Constitution, at subsection (8): "The Legislature may provide 
by law for the exemption from taxation: of not to exceed 45 % of the fair market 
value of residential property as defined by law..." (emphasis added). These 
subsections combine together to make possible the provision, by law, of a 
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residential property tax exemption, if the legislature chooses to implement the 
exemption. Implicit in the legislature's power to "provide by law for the 
exemption," is the power to regulate how the exemption arises in the property. See, 
by analogy, First Sec. Mortg. Co. v. Salt Lake County. 866 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Ut. 
App. 1993)("The constitutional requirement of equal and uniform taxation of 
property is implemented only through legislative provisions.") 
The legislature made available a residential exemption, to the amount 
authorized by the Utah Constitution, at U.C.A. §59-2-103, and defined "residential 
property" as "any property used for residential purposes as a primary residence," at 
U.C.A. §59-2-102(27). Dennis v. Summit County, 933 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 1997). 
The legislature exercised its power to regulate how the residential exemption would 
arise in property and how the taxing entity would learn whether a property was 
being, "used for residential purposes as a primary residence," in Part 11 of the 
Property Tax Act, U.C.A. §59-2-1101, et. seq., titled "Exemptions." The specific 
relevant section is U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), which reads: 
No reduction may be made in the value of property and no exemption may be 
granted unless the party affected or the party's agent makes and files with the 
board a written application for the reduction or exemption, verified by signed 
statement, and appears before the board and shows facts upon which it is 
claimed the reduction should be made, or exemption granted. The board may 
waive the application or personal appearance requirements 
(emphasis added). From this section Summit County concludes that the filing of an 
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application in support of a residential property tax exemption is a condition 
precedent to the classification of real property as primary residential; and, 
accordingly, without satisfactory occurrence of the condition precedent, no unlawful 
taxation claim based solely on a residential property exemption can be successfully 
maintained. 
The actual words, "residential property exemption," do not appear in the 
"Exemptions" Part of the Property Tax Act. This does not mean, however, that the 
Part does not apply to the residential property exemption. U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) 
unambiguously states that "no exemption may be granted. . ." unless the signed 
application requirements have been met (emphasis added.) Summit County 
contends that, "no exemption" means "no exemption." Longstanding rules of 
statutory construction urge this Court to look exclusively to the plain meaning of the 
statute unless the statute is ambiguous; and, there exists no ambiguity here. CIG 
Exploration v. Utah State Tax Commission, 897 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1995) and 
Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Board, 949 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 1997). 
If the legislature intended to limit the application requirements of U.C.A. 
§59-2-1102(3) to the exemptions delineated in Part 11, or to except out other 
exemptions from coverage, then the legislature would have proceeded with that 
level of specificity. But instead, the legislature ail-inclusively said, "no exemption" 
shall be granted without compliance with the stated requirements; and, the 
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exemption procedure, applicable to all Property Tax exemptions, appears in a 
logical place-within that Part of the Property Tax Act dealing with exemptions. 
In the instant case, A.E. Inc. failed to file an application for the primary 
residential exemption for its two properties in any of the years of the alleged 
unlawful taxation. (Record at 75, 15-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 132-
133-Addendum, Tab 4; Record at 155, 14-Addendum of Appellant 20; Record at 
179-Addendum of Appellant 18 at page 3.) Because the condition precedent to the 
classification of the subject property as primary residential did not occur, A.E. Inc. 
has no "unlawful" taxation claim; and therefore, the district court's order of 
summary judgment for Summit County was correct and should be affirmed. 
ii. TAX COMMISSION RULES 
That the legislature intended taxpayer affirmative action in the form of an 
application filing, as a condition precedent to a residential exemption arising in 
favor of real property, is illustrated by the adoption of rules to just that affect by the 
Utah State Tax Commission. The State Tax Commission has said, "If a person 
requests a property be designated as a primary residence," then, "The property 
owner has the burden of proving that property qualifies for the (primary residential) 
exemption," and in, "the county where application is made," the assessor should 
look to, "driver's license and/or voter registration information," and other, 
"conclusive evidence," to determine that, "the property serves as the person's 
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primary residence" (emphasis added.) Standard of Practice 2.13, Property Tax 
Administration Standards of Practice. (Record at 71-Addendum, Tab 2; Addendum, 
Tab 1). The Tax Commission thus appears to view the residential property 
exemption as only arising after the performance of three conditions precedent: an 
application, review of evidence such as the driver's license and registration of the 
applicant, and a determination of qualification. 
iii. TAXATION PRACTICALITIES 
Also of note are the practicalities of a condition precedent to property tax 
exemption status. The taxpayer is in exclusive control of all the information 
required for the proper determination of a residential property exemption. The 
taxpayer should therefore have the duty of coming forward with the information 
necessary to establish the exemption. If the taxing authority were charged with the 
responsibility to seek out and discover the factual basis to support all or any 
exemption possibly available to a piece of property, much of the revenues generated 
by property taxation would be consumed by an exemption investigation team. 
Government efficiencies and economy of resources thus support Summit County's 
interpretation that taxpayers must apply for exemptions. 
Finally, as outlined previously, the Utah Constitution impliedly grants the 
legislature the authority to regulate residential property exemptions. U.C.A. §59-2-
1102(3) is specifically tailored to that function; and, within the Code, U.C.A. §59-
19 
2-1102(3) alone is capable of regulating the creation of a residential property 
exemption. As a matter of public policy, the legislature should be deemed to have 
exercised that authority; otherwise, a taxing entity would bear the untenable duty of 
seeking out numerous hidden facts in exclusive taxpayer control to eliminate 
improper residential property exemptions. 
In conclusion, Summit County prays this Court to affirm the district court's 
entry of summary judgment in it's favor and hold that A.E. Inc.'s two units of real 
property were not unlawfully taxed for the years 1992 through 1996. 
B. RESPONSE TO A.E. INC.'S APPEAL OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON THE 
UNLAWFUL TAXATION ISSUE 
A.E. Inc. attacks Summit County's enforcement of the primary residential 
property application requirement based on the absence of any of the following: (1) 
statutory authority, (2) applicable tax commission rule, and (3) applicable Summit 
County ordinances. The first basis is an issue of interpretation and the second and 
third bases are improperly raised on appeal and are irrelevant to this Court. 
(1) Statutory Authority. A.E. Inc. contends that U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) does 
not require an application to qualify for the primary residential property exemption. 
In so contending, A.E. Inc. ignores the plain language of the section where it ail-
inclusively says, "no exemption may be granted," without filing an application. 
A.E. Inc. ignores this plain language because, as it says, "Part 11 is entitled 
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'Exemptions' and lists the (7) exemptions it covers" (emphasis added). (Brief of 
Appellant at 7.) 
Part 11 expressly covers more than 7 exemptions. Indeed, Part 11 
specifically creates numerous exemptions. It creates all 7 exemptions listed in 
U.C.A. §59-2-1101(2). It also creates exemptions for: (8 & 9) disabled veterans 
and one for an unremarried surviving spouse of the same; (10 & 11) blind persons 
and one for an unremarried surviving spouse of the same; (12) "poor persons;" (13) 
property used to furnish power for irrigation purposes; (14) property used for 
irrigation purposes; and, (15-18) livestock, household furnishings, inventory and 
other tangible personal property held for sale. See U.C.A. §59-2-1104 to -1114. 
The only section in Part 11 that does not create an exemption is U.C.A. §59-2-
1102. That section deals with procedures! And the procedure at U.C.A. §59-2-
1102(3), governs all property tax exemptions. 
In discounting Summit County's stated statutory authority, A.E. Inc. also 
makes much of the phrase in U.C.A. §59-2-1101, which reads, "The exemptions 
authorized by this part may be allowed only if the claimant is the owner of the 
property as of January 1. . ." (with text as underlined in the Brief of Appellant at 
8.) But that phrase is not saying that, "Only the exemptions listed in this part are 
controlled by this part," which is the meaning A.E. Inc. is proposing. Clearly the 
phrase means that: for those exemptions created in Part 11, ownership on New 
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Years Day is determinative. The opening phrase of Part 11 does not diminish 
Summit County's statutory argument. 
And finally, A.E. Inc. notes for the court in a footnote that the, "affidavit 
requirement of 59-2-1101 was eliminated May 1, 2000. It now provides for a 
signed statement." (Brief of Appellant at 10, fn. 3.) This is irrelevant. The 
formerly required affidavit of U.C.A. §59-2-1101 is truly applicable only to the 7 
exemptions created there. But an application, verified by signed statement, was and 
still is required by U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), for all other property tax exemptions, 
including the primary residential exemption. 
Applicable Tax Commission Rule. A.E. Inc. raises for the first time on 
appeal that Standard of Practice 2.13 was not in effect until 1997. (Brief of 
Appellant at 17). That assertion is without foundation. A.E. Inc. massages dates 
and language in the standard to proffer this new contention. (Brief of Appellant at 
17, fn. 9.; Addendum, Tab 1). Summit County prays this Court to ignore the same 
as not being preserved for appeal. In the Matter of the Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 
128 (Utah 1978). Or, please accept Summit County's proffer, based on recent 
discussions with the Property Tax Division, that the advisory notes with the dates 
that A.E. Inc. relies upon were added to the standard in a revision promulgated 
years after the original. But whenever the standard was promulgated, it still shows 
that the Tax Commission concurs with Summit County's statutory interpretation. 
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A.E. Inc. also notes that Standard of Practice 2.13 does not require an 
affidavit. (Brief of Appellant at 17.) The word, "affidavit," does not appear in the 
standard. But, the standard does say, "If a person requests a property be 
designated as a primary residence," then, "The property owner has the burden of 
proving that property qualifies for the (primary residential) exemption," and in, "the 
county where application is made," the assessor should look to, "driver's license 
and/or voter registration information," and other, "conclusive evidence," to 
determine that, "the property serves as the person's primary residence" (emphasis 
added). Standard of Practice 2.13, Property Tax Administration Standards of 
Practice. (Addendum, Tab 1.) The standard's use of the word "application," is, 
therefore, consistent with the statute which says, ". . .no exemption may be granted 
unless the party affected or the party's agent makes and files with the board a 
written application for the reduction or exemption, verified by signed statement. 
" U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3). (Emphasis added). 
Applicable Summit County Ordinances. A.E. Inc. raises yet another issue 
for the first time on appeal: the lack of applicable Summit County ordinances. A.E. 
Inc. cites Summit County Ordinance 319, dated September 22, 1997, for the 
proposition that it was not until 1997 that the County began requiring taxpayers to 
apply for the primary residential property tax exemption. (Brief of Appellant at 2, 
3, 4, 6 & 11; Addendum of Appellant 10). In that sense, A.E. Inc. is using the 
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ordinance as a factual assertion. Summit County prays this Court to disregard the 
ordinance for A.E. Inc.'s desired factual assertion as not preserved for appeal. In 
the Matter of the Estate of Cluff. 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978). 
Nevertheless, Summit County affirmatively states that it has been requiring 
taxpayers to apply for the primary residential property tax exemption for at least the 
time period since the current Assessor has been in office-January 7, 1991. That 
implication may be drawn from the Summit County Assessor's affidavit-a fact that 
has been preserved for appeal. (Record at 61-63; Addendum, Tab 2). 
Please note also, that U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), has been in effect virtually 
without change since February of 1988, though the word, "oath," was replaced 
with, "signed statement," this last legislative session. Summit County noted for the 
district court and therefore preserved for appeal, the fact that U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) 
was in effect long before A.E. Inc. paid it's taxes under protest. (Record at 129; 
Addendum, Tab 4). It was under the authority of U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) that 
Summit County was requiring an application for the primary residential exemption 
in 1991. Ordinance 319 was simply a reaffirmation of that longstanding practice. 
A.E. Inc. has also made much of the fact that Ordinance 319 notes that Part 
11 of the Property Tax Act is "silent" as to the residential exemption. (Brief of 
Appellant at 9; Addendum of Appellant 10). This does not mean that Summit 
County took the position that the "Exemptions" part of the statute did not apply to 
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the primary residential exemption. Indeed, Summit County expressly went on in its 
ordinance to use Part 11 as the authority for requiring the taxpayer to come forward 
with the proof necessary to receive a primary residential exemption. 
A.E. Inc. also references a Summit County Resolution, dated June 9, 1992, 
in its "Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented," where it cites page 61 of 
the Record. (Brief of Appellant at 5; Addendum of Appellant 5). There is no 
mention of the Resolution at that page, nor anywhere in the Record. The 1992 
Resolution was never before the district court. Therefore, Summit County prays 
this Court to disregard A.E. Inc.'s contentions on the Resolution as not preserved 
for appeal. In the Matter of the Estate of Cluff. 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978). 
A.E. Inc. cites the 1992 Resolution for the proposition that Summit County, 
"abused A.E. Inc. by assessing its property at the higher secondary residence rate 
and refusing a refund." (Brief of Appellant at 11). The three school districts in 
Summit County and other entities who lost revenues back when the 1992 Resolution 
was passed to accommodate taxpayers may well have thought they were abused too. 
A.E. Inc.'s subjective feelings are not at issue. The County Commission of 1992 
had the authority to pass the one-time tax amnesty of the 1992 Resolution. And, the 
County Commission of 1997, a different body, was both unbound by the previous 
Commission's fact intensive and time-limited resolution, and were also free to make 
factual distinctions between the requested refunds of 1992 and those of A.E. Inc.. 
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Therefore, having considered A.E. Inc.'s brief, it remains Summit County's 
conclusion that this Court should affirm the district court's entry of summary 
judgment in Summit County's favor and hold that A.E. Inc.'s two units of real 
property were not unlawfully taxed for the years 1992 through 1996. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARRED RECOVERY BY A.E. 
INC. ON IT'S CLAIMS FOR ALL YEARS EXCEPT 1996 
Summit County argues in this Point that the district court was correct in 
ruling that the statute of limitations barred A.E. Inc.'s claims as to 1992 through 
1995. In subsection A, Summit County puts forth the foundations of this argument, 
and in subsection B, Summit County again specifically responds to A.E. [nc.'s 
assertions on this matter. 
A. A.E. INC.'S DISTRICT COURT ACTION WAS 
FILED WITHIN FOUR YEARS OF ONLY THE 
1996 TAX PAYMENT 
The material facts on this point were undisputed before the district court: 
A.E. Inc. filed it's complaint on December 22, 1999, more than four years after 
A.E. Inc. paid it's 1992 through 1995 property taxes. (Record at 75, 116-7-
Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 106, 115-6-Addendum, Tab 3.) And, the Statute of 
Limitations bars actions under U.C.A. §59-2-1327 commenced more than four 
years after the day of a tax payment under protest. 
A case cited in the annotation to U.C.A. §59-2-1327, Centennial Eureka 
26 
Mining Co. v. Juab County, 62 P. 1024, (Utah 1900), is directly on point. There, 
the property tax collected was unlawful because it was on mine proceeds pursuant to 
a Utah Constitutional subsection that had yet to take affect. 
In Centennial, the Utah Supreme Court recited what has become the 
longstanding and unvaried rule in Utah as to when a cause of action accrues in cases 
of payment of taxes under protest: ". . . [A]t the moment the plaintiff paid the 
unlawful tax under protest he acquired a right to institute suit against the defendant, 
and was not required, as claimed by defendant's counsel, to first present a claim to 
the county court, or take any other steps, as a condition precedent to bringing his 
action." Centennial, 62 P. at 1026. Then, the Court said how long a tax protestor 
has to commence an action once a payment of tax under protest cause of action has 
accrued under the predecessor to U.C.A. §59-2-1327: "An action for relief not 
hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause of 
action shall have accrued." Centennial, 62 P. at 1026. 
The rule as laid out in Centennial applies to the instant case as follows: 1) the 
cause of action for A.E. Inc.'s 1995 claim accrued November 30, 1995 when it paid 
its 1995 taxes (Record at 75, 16-Addendum, Tab 2; Record at 106, 15-Addendum, 
Tab 3), 2) a four year Statute of Limitations applies to A.E. Inc.'s alleged cause of 
action, 3) the Statute of Limitations on A.E. Inc.'s 1992 through 1995 claims ran 
November 30, 1999, 4) and therefore, when A.E. Inc. filed it's complaint 
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December 22, 1999 (Record at 25), the Statute tolled only as to A.E. Inc. 's 
unlawful taxation claim for tax year 1996, the only year for which taxes were paid 
within four years of the complaint. 
Therefore, Summit County prays this Court to affirm the district court's 
entry of summary judgment and hold that A.E. Inc.'s claims of unlawful property 
taxation in the years 1992 through 1995 are barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
B. RESPONSE TO A.E. INC.'S APPEAL OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S RULING ON THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS ISSUE 
"The parties agree that a four (4) year statute of limitations governs actions 
under §59-2-1327, UCA." (Brief of Appellant at 18.) And, at oral argument on 
the motions for summary judgment, A.E. Inc. conceded that the statute of 
limitations starts to run when a tax is paid under protest. (Record at 190; 
Addendum of Appellant 18.) Therefore, the claims of A.E. Inc. for 1992 through 
1995 are appropriately barred under the statute of limitations unless A.E. Inc. 
shows both a legal and factual basis upon which the statute should be tolled. A.E. 
Inc. has done neither. 
i. POSSIBLE LEGAL BASIS 
Summit County is uncertain as to what A.E. Inc. may be asserting as a legal 
basis to toll the statute of limitations. However, by citing U.C.A. §78-12-40 (the 
"savings statute"), C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime Victim's Reparations, 966 P.2d 
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1226 (Ut. App. 1998), and concluding that "1993 through 1995 are not barred" 
(Brief of Appellant at 19), it appears that A.E. Inc. believes that it's April 24, 1997 
request on Summit County for a refund is an "action" under U.C.A. §78-12-40, 
which can be "saved" once dismissed not upon the merits. A.E. Inc. needs the 
statute to toll from April 24, 1997 to save the taxes paid from 1993 forward. 
However, C.P. does not provide any support for the proposition that an 
administrative proceeding is an "action" within the meaning of the "savings statute." 
In C.P., the plaintiff pursued an administrative remedy for crime victim reparations 
through to appeal before the Crime Victims' Board. That appeal was denied. The 
plaintiff then filed, in a timely manner, her, "first complaint and petition for Judicial 
Review of Informal Adjudicative Proceedings," in the Third District Court. IcL at 
1228. That district court action was dismissed, not on the merits, for failure to 
serve. Ten days later, after the time to appeal the administrative action to the courts 
had run, the plaintiff filed a second district court action. The second district court 
action is what was "saved" by U.C.A. §78-12-40; it was not an administrative 
action that was "saved." Therefore, C.P. does not support A.E. Inc.'s possible 
assertion that an administrative proceeding may be an "action" within U.C.A. §78-
12-40. 
ii. FACTUAL BASIS 
Even if this Court concludes that an administrative proceeding is an "action" 
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within the meaning of the "savings statute," A.E. Inc. still does not have a factual 
uasis to make that assertion in the instant case. A.E. Inc. did not properly initiate 
an administrative remedy; for, as the Utah State Tax Commission stated, A.E. Inc., 
"did not comply with the administrative remedies of timely filing an appeal with the 
County Board of Equalization annually within thirty days from the date of the 
property tax notices " (Record at 88; Addendum, Tab 3; U.C.A. §59-2-1004.) 
In other words, the April 24, 1997 refund request was from one to five years late 
according to the required procedure of each tax year. Accordingly, there never 
existed an administrative proceeding that could serve as an "action" under the 
"savings statute." Therefore, A.E. Inc. has shown no factual basis upon which to 
overrule the district court on the statute of limitations question. 
If the Court finds that the April 24, 1997 request on the Board of 
Equalization is a validly initiated administrative remedy, it still should not be 
"saved" by U.C.A. §78-12-40. U.C.A. §59-2-1102(7) and U.C.A. §59-2-1006(1) 
require that appeals from the Board of Equalization on property tax exemption 
matters must be filed with the Utah State Tax Commission within thirty days of a 
final decision by the Board. The Board of Equalization denied A.E. Inc.'s request 
on August 17, 1997 and A.E. Inc. did not appeal that decision to the Tax 
Commission until July 16, 1998-one day short of 10 months late. Therefore, A.E. 
Inc.'s administrative remedy, if initiated at all, ended on August 17, 1997 and A.E. 
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Inc.'s complaint on December 22, 1999, was over 16 months beyond the one year 
savings period of U.C.A. §78-12-40. (Record at 74, 118-9-Addendum, Tab 2; 
105, t1ll-l2~Addendum, Tab 3). Again, A.E. Inc. has shown no factual basis on 
which to overrule the district court on the statute of limitations question. 
III. RESPONSE TO A.E. INC.'S APPEAL OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S DENIAL OF A.E. INC.'S CROSS-MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A.E. Inc. argues in section 3 of it's Brief of Appellant that the district court 
erred in denying it's motion for summary judgment. A.E. Inc. is therefore saying 
that, as to it's motion: 1) there were no genuine issues of material fact and 2) A.E. 
Inc. was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P.. If this 
Court accepts either Summit County's interpretation of the law as set forth in 
sections I and II of this brief, or that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to 
A.E. Inc.'s motion, then the Court should also affirm the district court's denial of 
A.E. Inc.'s summary judgment motion. 
Summit County hereby incorporates by reference sections I and II, infra., as 
opposition to A.E. Inc.'s contention that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. But also, Summit County contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
which exists solely as to A.E. Inc.'s motion. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah. 
780 P.2d 821 (Ut. App. 1989)("cross motions may be viewed as involving a 
contention by each movant that no genuine issue of fact exists under the theory it 
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advances, but not as a concession that no dispute remains under the theory advanced 
by its adversary"). 
A.E. Inc. brought it's motion for summary judgment to the district court 
merely on allegations. A.E. Inc. alleged that "During all times in question, 1992 
through 1996, Bret Anderson resided on the real property, qualifying it for the 
residential exemption." (Record at 104; Addendum, Tab 3). Summit County 
offered an allegation in response: "1. Defendants dispute all reference in Plaintiffs 
Motion and Memorandum to any factual basis that Bret Anderson has resided on the 
subject property since 1992 as an incorrect legal conclusion drawn from Plaintiffs 
Exhibit B." (Record at 140; Addendum, Tab 5). Accordingly, because these 
allegations exhibited a genuine issue of material fact, A.E. Inc.'s motion for 
summary judgment was properly denied. 
Summit County's opposing allegation would be insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact if A.E. Inc.'s motion was supported at the district court by an 
affidavit. Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah 1984)("When read in light of 
section (b) of Rule 56, which provides that the party moving for summary judgment 
may do so 'with or without supporting affidavits,' it is clear that the section (e) 
requirement that a party opposing the summary judgment motion file counter-
affidavits applies only when the moving party has elected to and has filed affidavits 
in support of the motion.") A.E. Inc.'s motion was not supported by affidavit. 
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The "Summit County Affidavit of Primary Residence" which A.E. Inc. 
attached to it's summary judgment motion (Record at 18, 94; Addendum of 
Appellant 6; Record at 140-Addendum, Tab 5; Record at 185-186, Addendum of 
Appellant 18) is not an affidavit within the meaning of Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.. Rule 
56(e), U.R.C.P., requires that affidavits in a motion for summary judgment, "shall 
be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters stated therein." The "Summit County Affidavit of Primary Residence" of 
A.E. Inc. meets none of these requirements. 
The "Summit County Affidavit of Primary Residence" of A.E. Inc. is signed 
by counsel for A.E. Inc., Mr. Marsden, and does not show how the facts contained 
in it are, "made on personal knowledge," of Mr. Marsden, or that Mr. Marsden is, 
"competent to testify," to the dates of residency. And, because Mr. Marsden signed 
as an agent of the Corporation (legal counsel) and not as an officer, the document 
needs to show, "the specific 'means and sources' of his information." Utah Farm 
Production Credit Ass'n v. Watts. 737 P.2d 154 (Utah 1987). And for these 
reasons, Summit County also contends that the "Summit County Affidavit of 
Primary Residence" of A.E. Inc. would not be "admissible in evidence" pursuant to 
Rules 601 and 602 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which admissibility is required 
by Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.. 
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Furthermore, U.C.A. §78-26-5 states that: "An affidavit to be used before 
any court, judge, or officer of this state may be taken before any judge, the clerk of 
any court, any justice court judge, or any notary public in this state." The "Summit 
County Affidavit of Primary Residence" of A.E. Inc. was not taken before a judge, 
the clerk of any court, any justice court judge, or any notary public in this state. 
(Record at 94-Addendum, Tab 3). 
The "Summit County Affidavit of Primary Residence" of A.E. Inc. simply 
contains more allegations by A.E. Inc.'s counsel. And, because it is signed by 
counsel for A.E. Inc., Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, "Lawyer as 
Witness," would probably be implicated if A.E. Inc. sought to have the document 
considered an affidavit within the meaning of Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.. 
Therefore, even if the questions of law of sections I and II, infra., are not 
resolved by this Court in Summit County's favor, A.E. Inc.'s summary judgment 
cross-motion was properly denied for the existence of a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Summit County prays this Court to affirm the 
district court's grant of summary judgment and conclusions that the taxation of A.E. 
Inc.'s property for 1992 through 1996 was not unlawful and that A.E. Inc.'s claims 
of unlawful taxation for 1992 through 1995 are barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
V* DATED t h i s ^ _ day of ^ t ^ ^ ^ " , 2000. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. ADKINS 
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY 
By: / ! _ _ : 
DAVID G. BAYLES CS 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
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36 
Tabl 
service member is stationed out of Utah, but the personal property remains in Utah, the property 
is not exempt from property tax. 
2.12.3 Personal Property of Non-Utah Residents Stationed in Utah. Personal property 
owned by non-Utah residents who are members of the armed forces and stationed under military 
orders in Utah is exempt from property tax. The assessor may rely on a letter from the 
commanding officer or other documentation verifying out-of-state residency and military orders 
assigning the service member to Utah. For example, if the non-Utah resident service member 
owned a non-commercial mobile home in Utah, the property would be exempt. (50 USC 574) 
Standard of Practice 2*13 
Primary Residential Exemption 
2.13.0 Primary Residential Exemption. Utah law requires assessors to exempt from 
taxation 45% of the fair market value of residential property. [Section 59-2-130(2)] Utah Code 
Annotated Section 59-2-102(22) and rule R884-24P-52 define residential property, for purposes 
of the exemption, to be a primary residence. A primary residence does not include property used 
for transient residential use, or condominiums used in rental nools. [Utah State Constitution, 
Article XIII, Section 2(8), (59-2-103)] 
To qualify, a property need not be owner occupied. Apartments and other rental housing 
used as a primary residence qualify for the exemption. The assessor shall grant the residential 
exemption to the first one acre of land, if listed in the same parcel description. The property 
owner has the burden of proving that property qualifies for the exemption. 
Guidelines: 
• A "primary residence" is the principal place where one actually lives as 
distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn. Though motel and other 
transient properties would not meet this definition, typical student housing, used 
by renters during the school year (more than six months), would qualify for the 
exemption. 
• If a person requests a property be designated as a primary residence, the 
exemption should not be granted without conclusive evidence that the property 
serves as the person's primary residence. If the person's address on the Utah 
driver's license and/or voter registration is in a county different from that of the 
property location address, the county where the application is made should notify 
the other county assessor. 
• Where a person or persons own more than one residence in Utah, none of which 
are used as rental property, only one of the residences may qualify as a primary 
residence. Only the residence which is occupied more than six months out of the 
year qualifies for the exemption. 
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• Married couples may only claim one property as a primary residence except where 
separate residences are maintained and occupied under a court approved 
separation agreement 
Further instruction has been provided by the Commission in an Advisory Opinion dated 
September 17,1997. This advisory opinion states: 
"Property that is eligible for the primary residential exemption on the lien date is entitled 
to the exemption, even if the property is temporarily unoccupied For example, assume that a 
home was sold prior to the lien and the seller moved out prior to the lien date. Assume also that 
the new owner does not move in until after January 1st. So long as the property use meets the 
criteria for the primary residential exemption, the fact that it was temporarily unoccupied on the 
January 1st is irrelevant The situation may also arise with rental property that serves as the 
primary residence of the tenants. The fact that the property may be temporarily vacant on the lien 
date should not defeat the exemption. 
"Another example of a primary residential property that may be unoccupied on the lien 
date is a home under construction. It is our position that when property is committed to a. 
qualifying use, that property is eligible for the exemption if (1) the dwelling is under construction 
on the lien date, (2) the assessor has evidence that the house is being constructed for use as a 
qualifying residential dwelling, and (3) the property is actually put to use as a primary residential 
property upon completion during the tax year. If all of those conditions are met, the exemption 
relates back to the lien date. This is true even if the owner is living in another primary residence 
during construction. The primary exemption is based on the intended use of the two residences, 
not the occupants. 
"The only distinctions that we have drawn with regard to a property owner who owns two 
homes in Utah are as follows: 
"(1) If the property owner is a Utah resident, but neither of the homes is rented or 
leased for use as a primary residence of another party. We assume that the owner is using one 
home as a primary residence and the other as a secondary residence." 
"(2) If the property owner is not a Utah resident, but owns residential property in 
Utah, we assume that the owner is using the Utah property as secondary property unless the 
owner shows that it its being used as a primary residence." (Dennis v. Summit county, 933 P.2d 
387) 
Standard of Practice 2.14 
General Personal Property Exemptions 
2.14*0 General Exemptions. "Household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used 
exclusively by the owner at the owner's residence in maintaining a home for the owner and the 
owner's family are exempt from property taxation." [Section 59-2-1113 and Utah State 
Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2 (8)] 
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Judge Robert K. Hilder 
COME NOW the Defendants, The Summit County Commission, The Summit County 
Board of Equalization, The Summit County Assessor, and The Summit County Treasurer, by 
and through their counsel of record, and submit this Memorandum in Support of their Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiff is an owner of two units of real property in Deer Valley, Summit County, 
Utah (Complaint, J 1). 
2. For the tax years 1992 through 1996, Unit 7 of plaintiff s property was assessed as .98 
acres of land, improved with a building and Unit 8 of plaintiff's property was assessed 
as .59 acres of unimproved land (Defendants' Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Barbara J. 
Kresser, County Assessor). 
3. Plaintiff filed a letter with the Summit County Treasurer in each tax year, 1993 - 1996, 
asserting payment of property taxes under protest (Complaint, Exhibit A). 
4. Plaintiff claims that he should have been given a residential property tax exemption for 
the subject real property for the tax years 1992 through 1996 (Complaint, f 3). 
5. Plaintiff never filed an application or affidavit for a residential property tax exemption 
with Summit County, as required by U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), nor did Plaintiff ever 
provide any evidence that he qualified for the residential property tax exemption during 
tax years 1992 - 1996. (Defendants' Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Barbara J. Kresser, County 
Assessor). 
6. Plaintiff paid his 1995 property taxes on November 30, 1995. (Defendants' Exhibit 2, 
Affidavit of Glen Thompson, County Treasurer). 
7. Plaintiffs property taxes for the years 1992 through 1994 were paid before the end of 
each year they were due. (Defendants' Exhibit 2, Affidavit of Glen Thompson, County 
ii 
Treasurer). 
On February 3, 1997, plaintiff submitted an application for residential property tax 
exemption to Summit County. Thereafter, on April 17, 1997, Plaintiff was granted 
residential property tax exempt status for tax year 1997 and thereafter. (Defendants' 
Exhibit 3, Letter of Steve Martin, Sr. Staff Appraiser). 
On August 14, 1997, the Board of Commissioners, sitting as the Board of Equalization, 
denied Plaintiffs request for a property tax refund for tax years 1992 - 1996, citing the 
failure of Plaintiff to properly request a residential property tax exemption in each of 
those years. (Defendants' Exhibit 1, Letter of Barbara J. Kresser, County Assessor). 
Nearly a year later, on July 16, 1998, Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Board of 
Equalization to the Utah State Tax Commission (Defendant's Exhibit 4, Notice of 
Appeal). 
On October 6, 1999, the Utah State Tax Commission dismissed the Plaintiff's Petition 
(Complaint, Exhibit D). 
Plaintiff filed a Request for Reconsideration of the dismissal on October 15, 1999, and 
the Utah State Tax Commission denied that request on December 8, 1999 (Compaint, 
Exhibits E & F). 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Plaintiff complains that his two units of real property in Deer Valley were taxed 
"unlawfully" pursuant to U.C.A. §59-24327 and U.C.A. §59-1-103 for the tax years 1992 
through 1996. The plaintiffs sole allegation of unlawfulness is that the property should have 
been afforded a primary residential exemption for each of those years. Defendants argue in 
Point I that a residential exemption fails to arise in favor of the two units of real property for 
the years in question and that plaintiff thus fails to establish a basis for a finding of unlawful 
taxation. Defendants argue in Point II that the statute of limitations bars plaintiffs claims as to 
1992 through 1995. Defendants briefly argue in Points III and IV that any exemption claim for 
unit 8 fails because either it is unimproved or because only the first acre of residential property 
may be exempted and plaintiffs two units total 1.57 acres. 
POINT I. 
This Court should enter summary judgment against the plaintiff if there are no genuine 
issues of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
U.R.C.P. 56(c). The only material fact is undisputed: no affidavit and application for a 
residential property exemption was filed for the subject property. These filings and the 
attendant qualification evaluation are required in Utah before a residential property exemption 
1 
arises to the benefit of real property. In the absence of the appropriate filings and evaluation, 
pursuant to the governing law, plaintiffs claim of "unlawful" taxation fails; and therefore, 
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint with prejudice. 
Utah Constitution, Art. XIII, §2, subsection (1), states, "All tangible property in the 
state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or under this Constitution, shall be 
taxed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by 
law." (Emphasis added). An "exempt(ion). . .under this Constitution" for residential 
property is delineated later in the same Article and section of the Utah Constitution, at 
subsection (8): "The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of not to 
exceed 45 % of the fair market value of residential property as defined by law..." (Emphasis 
added). These subsections combine together to make possible the provision, by law, of a 
residential property tax exemption, if the legislature chooses to implement the exemption. 
Further, implicit in the legislature's power to "provide by law for the exemption," is the 
power to regulate how the exemption arises in the property. 
The legislature made available a residential exemption, to the amount authorized by the 
Utah Constitution, at U.C.A. §59-2-103. And, the legislature exercised its power to regulate 
how the residential exemption would arise in property in Part 11 titled "Exemptions." The 
specific relevant section is U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), which reads: 
No reduction may be made in the value of property and no exemption may be granted 
unless the party affected or the party's agent makes and files with the board a written 
application for the reduction or exemption, verified by oath, and appears before the 
2 
board and shows facts upon which it is claimed the reduction should be made, or 
exemption granted. The board may waive the application or personal appearance 
requirements 
(Emphasis added). From this section defendants conclude that the filing of an affidavit and 
application in support of a residential property exemption is a condition precedent to the 
classification of real property as primary residential; and, accordingly, without satisfactory 
occurrence of the condition precedent, no unlawful taxation claim based solely on a residential 
property exemption can be successfully maintained. 
In the instant case, there is no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff failed to file 
an affidavit or application for the primary residential exemption for his two properties in any 
of the years of the alleged unlawful taxation. (Statement of Material Facts 15). Because the 
condition precedent to the classification of the subject property as primary residential did not 
occur, no "unlawful" taxation claims are supported by plaintiffs complaint; and therefore, 
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the plaintiffs complaint with 
prejudice. 
That the legislature intended taxpayer affirmative action in the form of an affidavit and 
application filing, as a condition precedent to a residential exemption arising in favor of real 
property, is illustrated by the adoption of rules to just that affect by the Utah State Tax 
Commission. The State Tax Commission has said, "The property owner has the burden of 
proving that property qualifies for the (primary residential) exemption," and in "the county 
where application is made," the assessor should look to "driver's license and/or voter 
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registration information" and other "conclusive evidence" to determine that "the property 
serves as the person's primary residence." The Utah Tax Commission thus appears to view 
the residential property exemption as only arising after the performance of three conditions 
precedent: an application, review of evidence such as the driver's license and registration of 
the applicant, and a determination of qualification. Standard of Practice 2.13, Property Tax 
Administration Standards of Practice. (Defendant's Exhibit 5). See also, R884-24P-52 
(Definition of "Primary Residence"). 
Also of note are the practicalities of a condition precedent to property tax exemption 
status. The taxpayer is in exclusive control of all the information required for the proper 
determination of a residential property exemption. The taxpayer should therefore have the 
duty of coming forth with the information necessary to establish the exemption. If the taxing 
authority were charged with the responsibility to seek out and discover the factual basis to 
support all or any exemption possibly available to a piece of property, much of the revenues 
generated by property taxation would be consumed by an exemption investigation team. 
Government efficiencies and economy of resources thus support defendants' interpretation that 
taxpayer's must apply for exemptions. 
In conclusion, defendants pray this Court to enter summary judgment in their favor and 
hold that plaintiffs two units of real property were not unlawfully taxed for the years 1992 
through 1996. 
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POINT II 
Even if this Court finds that the tax on plaintiff's two units of property was unlawful, 
summary judgment is still appropriate as to most of plaintiff s claims pursuant to the running 
of the Statute of Limitations. The material facts on this point are also undisputed: plaintiff 
filed his complaint in this action on December 23, 1999, more than four years after he paid his 
1992 through 1995 property taxes. (Statement of Material Facts, J |6 & 7) And, the Statute of 
Limitations bars actions under U.C.A. §59-2-1372 commenced more than four years after the 
day of a tax payment under protest. 
A case cited in the annotation to U.C.A. §59-2-1372, Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. 
Juab County. 62 P. 1024, (Utah 1900), is directly on point. There, the property tax collected 
was unlawful because it was on mine proceeds pursuant to a Utah Constitutional subsection 
that had yet to take affect. 
In Centennial, the Utah Supreme Court recited what has become the longstanding and 
unvaried rule in Utah as to when a cause of action accrues in cases of payment of taxes under 
protest: ". . .[A]t the moment the plaintiff paid the unlawful tax under protest he acquired a 
right to institute suit against the defendant, and was not required, as claimed by defendant's 
counsel, to first present a claim to the county court, or take any other steps, as a condition 
precedent to bringing his action." Centennial. 62 P. at 1026. Then, the Court said how long a 
tax protestor has to commence an action once a payment of tax under protest cause of action 
has accrued under the predecessor to U.C.A. §59-2-1327: "An action for relief not 
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hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause of action shall 
have accrued." Centennial. 62 P. at 1026. 
The rule as laid out in Centennial applies to the instant case as follows: 1) the cause of 
action for plaintiffs 1995 claim accrued November 30, 1995 when he paid his 1995 taxes, 2) a 
four year Statute of Limitations applies to plaintiffs alleged cause of action, 3) the Statute of 
Limitations on plaintiffs 1992 through 1995 claims ran November 30, 1999, 4) and therefore, 
when plaintiff filed his complaint December 23, 1999, the Statute tolled only as to plaintiffs 
unlawful taxation claim for tax year 1996, the only year for which taxes were paid within four 
years of the complaint. 
Therefore, defendants pray this Court, in the alternative to the prayer sought in Point 
I., to enter summary judgment against plaintiff, holding that plaintiffs claims of unlawful 
property taxation in the years 1992 through 1995 are barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
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POINT III 
Property must be improved by a residence to be entitled to a primary residential 
exemption. U.C.A. §59-2-103(2). Unit 8 of plaintiff s property was assessed as unimproved 
land for all the tax years 1992 through 1996. (Statement of Material Facts f2). Therefore, 
defendants pray that summary judgment be entered against plaintiff declaring that the taxation 
of Unit 8 for 1992 through 1996 was not unlawful. 
POINT IV 
In the alternative to Point III, if Units 7 and 8 are considered by this Court to be one 
parcel, improved by a primary residence, then only the first acre of the 1.57 acres is entitled to 
the primary residential exemption pursuant to U.C.A. §59-2-103(3), which reads: "No more 
than one acre of land per residential unit may qualify for the residential exemption." And, 
accordingly, summary judgment should be entered against plaintiff declaring that 57/59ths1 of 
the taxation of Unit 8 for years 1992 through 1996, was not unlawful. 
1
 As 12 of Defendant's Exhibit 1 states, Unit 7 encompassed .98 acres and Unit 8 
encompassed .59 acres to total 1.57 acres. To compute a property tax exemption, with one acre 
of land exempt, the excess of plaintiff s property over one acre-or .57 acres-WOULD NOT BE 
EXEMPT. Therefore, multiplying 57/59 by the amount of the tax computed for Unit 8, would 
yield the lawful tax. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants prayer is for this Court to grant summary 
judgment in their favor and against the plaintiff, declaring that: 
1) The property taxation of plaintiff s property for 1992 through 1996 was not 
unlawful because the conditions precedent to a residential exemption arising in 
favor of the property were not met, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
2) Plaintiffs claims of unlawful taxation for 1992 through 1995 are barred by the 
Statute of Limitations, AND 
i. The property taxation of plaintiffs Unit 8 property for all years was not 
unlawful because Unit 8 was unimproved, OR 
ii. The property taxation of plaintiffs property for all years was not 
unlawful as to 57/59ths of the taxation of Unit 8 because only one acre 
of land per residential unit may qualify for a residential exemption. 
DATED this day of February, 2000. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. ADKINS 
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this - 3 ' day of /"Vi/\\i^'{/ , 2000, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be sent via 
United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Milo S. Marsden Jr. 
Marsden, Cahoon, Gottfredson & Bell, L.L.C. 
68 South Main Street, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
^ 
~)^?///C{' f.^C //?4^t^y 
r^. /-V SS. I 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
David L. Thomas, #7106 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
David G. Bayles, #8147 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (435) 336-4468 
Attorneys for Summit County 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.E., INC. a Utah Corporation, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION; 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT COUNTY 
ASSESSOR; AND SUMMIT 
COUNTY TREASURER, 
DEFENDANTS. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
BARBARA J. KRESSER 
Civil No. 990600463PR 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
I, Barbara J. Kresser, being duly sworn, state that I am the County Assessor, Summit 
County, State of Utah. I have acted in this capacity since January 7, 1991 
1. It is my official public duty to keep the records regarding property tax exemptions for 
Summit County, which includes all property tax exemption applications and affidavits. 
All property tax exemption applications and affidavits are promptly filed after receipt. 
All property tax exemption applications and affidavits are acted upon by the County 
Assessor and Board of Equalization in a timely manner during the regular course of 
official public duties as proscribed by statute and the rules of the Utah State Tax 
Commission. The documentation of such actions constitute official acts of the Board of 
Equalization and carries the force of law within Summit County. 
2. All original property tax exemption applications and affidavits are kept as official 
public records of the County under U.C.A. §§78-25-3 and 78-25-4, and as such, are 
open to public inspection. 
3. As the County Assessor, I am the official custodian of all property tax exemption 
documents, to include all applications and affidavits for property tax exempt status, and 
have personal knowledge of all official acts of the Board of Equalization. 
4. I certify that I have researched all records in the County Assessor's Office pertaining to 
Units 7 & 8, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No.s BEC-7 & BEC-8), which 
are the subject of this Complaint, and can find no record of an application or affidavit 
for a residential property tax exemption being filed in tax years 1992, 1993, 1994, 
1995, or 1996. In fact, the first evidence of such an application or affidavit being filed 
with the County Assessor is in February 1997. 
5. I certify that for the tax years 1992 through 1996, Unit 7 of plaintiff s property was 
assessed as .98 acres of land, improved with a building and Unit 8 of plaintiffs 
nr\o "J 
property was assessed as .59 acres of unimproved land. 
6. I have had several opportunities to communicate with Plaintiff concerning this matter. 
On August 11, 1997, the Summit County Board of Equalization denied Plaintiffs 
request for a property tax refund for the tax years 1992 through 1996 because Plaintiff 
failed to comply with the statutory and Utah State Tax Commission Standards of 
Practice in failing to properly apply for a residential property tax exemption during 
those taxable years. This has been explained repeatedly to Plaintiff by Summit County. 
I declare under penalty of perjury, that I am the below named person and that the 
foregoing Affidavit and facts as described in this document are true, complete and correct to 
the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
Date BARBARA J. KRESSER 
State of Utah 
Summit County 
) 
) ss. 
) 
•>rJ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by BARBARA J. KRESSER on this Jj>> day of 
rtlmtif/ » 200°- 9 
y 
y-7£//c£ 
V Public ' 
LONNJE A DAWSON 
60 M. Mar P O. Box 12* 
CoaivJe, Utah 84017 
My Commission Expire*-
December 18, 200C 
State o1 IMh 
Lojifiie A. Dawson 
Notary Public in and for the State 
Of Utah 
Residing in Coalville, Utah 
My commission expires: } ;y -/£ t^O 
(\ n f: H 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
David L. Thomas, #7106 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
David G. Bayles, #8147 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (435) 336-4468 
Attorneys for Summit County 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.E., INC. a Utah Corporation, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION; 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT COUNTY 
ASSESSOR; AND SUMMIT 
COUNTY TREASURER, 
DEFENDANTS. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
GLEN G. THOMPSON 
Civil No. 990600463PR 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
I, Glen Thompson, being duly sworn, state that I am the County Treasurer, Summit 
County, State of Utah. I have acted in this capacity since January 28, 1985. 
1. It is my official public duty to keep the records regarding tax payments for Summit 
County, which includes property tax payments. 
2. All tax payments are kept in a tax roll as an official public record of the County under 
U.C.A. §§78-25-3 and 78-25-4, and as such, are open to public inspection. 
3. As the County Treasurer, I am the official custodian of all the tax rolls of the County. 
4. I certify that I have researched the tax roll entries pertaining to Units 7 & 8, the Bald 
Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No.s BEC-7 & BEC-8), for the tax years 1992, 
1993, 1994, and 1995, and I find that the property taxes on the subject property in 1995 
were paid on November 30, 1995 and that all the property taxes for 1992 through 1994 
on the subject property were also paid before November 30, 1995. 
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I declare under penalty of perjury, that I am the below named person and that the 
foregoing Affidavit and facts as described in this document are true, complete and correct to 
the best of my knowledge, information and belief. 
J-3-CO 
Date 
^* ^ 
GLENG . THOMSON 
State of Utah 
Summit County 
) 
) ss. 
) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me by GLEN G. THOMPSON on this 3 rd day of 
PehrgAty , 2000. 
1 /? / 
V Public i 
\ / j ? 3 £ 2 * § k LONNlE A. DAWSON | 
' ' ' * ^ % 1 | i 60 N. Mdi P.O. Box 12b 1 
A. 'fc*2T T H, Coatv, ie, Utah &4017 
?H My C amission Expire* Ay C ;n 
December 18, 200C 
State of Itoh 
I 
Lortfiie A. DawsoTn 
Notary Public in and for the State 
Of Utah 
Residing in Coalville, Utah 
My commission expires: y - y ^ o?) 
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ISO* 
tUMMrrCouwrrComrrHougg 
MBoMarsden 
Fifth Floor 
68 South main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
RE: Primary Resident st 
DearMr. Marsden; 
Pursuant to our conversation of April 17,1997,1 will change the status of these two 
properties to Primary Residential based on the approved appfications you submitted on February 
3,1997. The current reduction in assessed value is 45% at the writing of this letter. 
The power to grant refunds based on the change in status for years previous to the current 
tax year does not rest with the Assessor. The Assessor can make changes in value for the current 
tax year (1997) only. All other matters of tax dollars, errors etc. are dealt with by the County 
Commissioners. It is my understanding that they would be reticent to grant refimds for prior years 
if the taxpayer had not filed their exemption application at some point in the past nor corrected 
the error through the Board of Equalization during the years in question. 
r . /• 
SSeveMaftin' 
Sr. Staff Appraiser 
Summit County Assesor's Office 
REC£/Vf? 
MILO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
FAX NO.: (801) 537-1315 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A. E., INC, a Utah ] 
Corporation, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF ' 
EQUALIZATION, ; 
Respondent ] 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
» Case No. 11'QI-Sl 
To the Utah State Tax Commission and the County Auditor of Summit County, State of 
Utah: 
Petitioner, A. E., Inc. a Utah corporation, hereby appeals from the inaction of the 
County Board of Equalization of Summit County, State of Utah, and respectfully shows: 
1. Petitioner is the owner of the following-described real property in Summit 
County, Utah: 
Unit 7, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No. 
BEC 7); and 
Unit 8, the Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No. BEC-8). 
2. Between 1992 and 1996, petitioner paid $70,182.79 excess real property taxes 
for respondent's failure to grant petitioner the residential exemption for the real property 
described above. A copy of the $70,182.79 annual analysis is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A". 
3. Respondent granted the residential exemption for the real properties in 1997. 
4. During 1992 through 1996, at all times, an individual residing on the property 
qualified the property for the residential exemption under Section 59-2-103 Utah Code 
Annotated. 
5. Respondent by its failure to act has denied petitioner the $70,182.79 refund for 
the years 1992 through 1996. Therefore, petitioner paid the taxes under protest, stating 
that the protest was because the property had not been given the benefit of the 
residential property tax exemption. 
6. Petitioner has made demand upon respondent for payment, but no payment 
has been made. Copies of the demand notices and the County's responses are attached 
hereto as Exhibit "B". 
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays judgment against respondent in the amount of 
$70,182.79, interest, costs of court, and general relief. 
DATED this Sfr* day of Jeae, 1998. 
Milo S. Maraden\ Jr. I J 
MARSDEN(C^HOON, GOTTFREDSON 
& BELL, LLC. 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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service member is stationed out of Utah, but the personal property remains in Utah, tfte property 
is not exempt from property tax. 
2-12.3 Personal Property of Non-Utah Residents Stationed in Utah. Personal property 
owned by non-Utah residents who are members of the armed forces and stationed under military 
orders in Utah is exempt from property tax. The assessor may rely on a letter from the 
commanding officer or other documentation verifying out-of-state residency and military orders 
assigning the service member to Utah. For example, if the non-Utah resident service member 
owned a non-commercial mobile home in Utah, the property would be exempt. (50 USC 574) 
Standard of Practice 2J3 
Primary Residential Exemption 
2-13.0 Primary Residential Exemption. Utah law requires assessors to exempt from 
taxation 45% of the fair market value of residential property. [Section 59-2-130(2)] Utah Code 
Annotated Section 59-2-102(22) and rule R884-24P-52 define residential property, for purposes 
of the exemption, to be a primary residence. A primary residence does not include property used 
for transient residential use, or condomMimas used in rental pools. [Utah State Constitution, 
Article XIII, Section 2(8), (59-2-103)] - -
To qualify-, a property need not be owner occupied. Apartments and other rental housing 
used as a primary residence qualify for the exemption. The assessor shall grant the residential 
exemption to the first one acre of land, if listed in the same parcel description. The property 
owner has the burden of proving that property qualifies for the exemption. 
Guidelines: 
• A "primary residence" is the principal place where one actually lives as 
distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn. Though motel and other 
transient properties would not meet this definition, typical student housing, used 
by renters during the school year (more than six months), would qualify for the 
exemption. 
• If a person requests a property be designated as a primary residence, the 
exemption should not be granted without conclusive evidence that the property 
serves as the person's primary residence. If the persons address on the Utah 
driver's license and/or voter registration is in a county different from that of the 
property location address, the county where the application is made should notify 
the other county assessor. 
• Where a person or persons own more than one residence in Utah, none of which 
are used as rental property, only one of the residences may qualify as a primary 
residence. Only the residence which is occupied more than six months out of the 
year qualifies for the exemption. 
2 - 1 6 
• Married couples may only claim one property as a primary residence except where 
separate residences are maintained and occupied under a court approved 
separation agreement. 
Further instruction has been provided by the Commission in an Advisory Opinion dated 
September 17,1997. This advisory opinion states: 
"Property that is eligible for the primary residential exemption on the lien date is entitled 
to the exemption, even if the property is temporarily unoccupied. For example, assume that a 
home was sold prior to the lien and the seller moved out prior to the lien date. Assume also that 
the new owner does not move in until after January 1st. So long as the property use meets the 
criteria for the primary residential exemption, the fact that it was temporarily unoccupied on the 
January 1st is irrelevant The situation may also arise with rental property that serves as the 
primary residence of the tenants. The fact that the property may be temporarily vacant on the lien 
date should not defeat the exemption. 
"Another example of a primary residential property that may be unoccupied on the lien 
date is a home under construction. It is our position that when property is committed to a. 
qualifying use, that property is eligible for the exemption if (1) the dwelling is under construction 
on the lien date, (2) the assessor has evidence that the house is being constructed for use as a 
qualifying residential dwelling, and (3) the property is actually put to use as a primary residential 
property upon completion during the tax year. If all of those conditions are met, the exemption 
relates back to the lien date. This is true even if the owner is living in another primary residence 
during construction. The primary exemption is based on the intended use of the two residences, 
not the occupants. 
"The only distinctions that we have drawn with regard to a property owner who owns two 
homes in Utah are as follows: 
"(1) If the property owner is a Utah resident, but neither of the homes is rented or 
leased for use as a primary residence of another party. We assume that the owner is using one 
home as a primary residence and the other as a secondary residence." 
"(2) If the property owner is not a Utah resident, but owns residential property in 
Utah, we assume that the owner is using the Utah property as secondary property unless the 
owner shows that it its being used as a primary residence." (Dennis v. Summit county, 933 P.2d 
387) 
Standard of Practice 2.14 
General Personal Property Exemptions 
2.14.0 General Exemptions. "Household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used 
exclusively by the owner at the owner's residence in maintaining a home for the owner and the 
'owner's family are exempt from property taxation." [Section 59-2-1113 and Utah State 
Constitution, Article XIII, Section 2 (8)] 
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MILO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, TAX DIVISION, STATE OF UTAH 
A. E., INC., a Utah Corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION; ' 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF '" 
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT ] 
COUNTY ASSESSOR; and SUMMIT ] 
COUNTY TREASURER, ] 
Defendants. ) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
l Civil No. 990600463PR 
) (Judge Robert K. Hilder) 
Plaintiff respectfully submits this Memorandum in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment which is submitted concurrently. 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to place in context the uncontested facts that follow, plaintiff offers this 
brief summary of the circumstances out of which this dispute arises. 
Plaintiff paid its real property taxes timely each year in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 
1996. Each year it paid protesting the non-residential classification. The protest was in 
By. 
F ILED 
FEB 1 4 2000 
Third District Court 9L. 
Deputy Submit County 
writmg and cited Utah Code Ann. Section 59-2-1327 and claimed entitlement to the 
residential exemption. 
The reason for the protest was that Bret Anderson resided on the property 
continuously for those years. 
Finally, in 1997 Defendants granted the residential exemption, but refused to 
refund anything for the years 1992-1996. 
After exhausting its administrative remedies with Summit County and the Utah 
State Tax Commission, Plaintiflf seeks redress from this Court under Utah Code Ann. 
Section 59-2-1327. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following facts are undisputed. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiff is an owner of two units of real property in Deer Valley, Summit 
County, Utah, described as follows: 
Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No. BEC 7). 
Unit 8, The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley (Serial No. BEC 8). 
[Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, If 1.] 
2. For the tax years 1992 through 1996, Unit 7 of Plaintiffs property was assessed 
as .98 acres of land, improved with a building; and Unit 8 of Plaintiffs property was 
assessed as .59 acres of unimproved land. [Defendants' Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Barbara J. 
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Kresser, County Assessor.] 
3. During the years 1992 through 1996, Defendants denied Plaintiff the primary 
residential exemption for such property. [Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, 1f 9.] 
4. For each of these years, Plaintiff paid the tax with a letter stating that the 
payment was made under protest and that Plaintiff was entitled to the residential 
exemption. A sample of the annual letter is attached as Exhibit "A". [Defendants' 
Statement of Material Facts, 11 3.] 
5. Plaintiff paid its 1995 property taxes on November 30, 1995. [Defendants' 
Statement of Material Facts, If 6.] 
6. Plaintiffs property taxes for the years 1992 through 1994 were paid before the 
end of each year they were due. [Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, If 7.] 
7. Plaintiff claims that he should have been given a residential property tax 
exemption for the subject real property for the tax years 1992 through 1996. 
[Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, If 4.] 
8. For the 1997 tax year, Defendants provided plaintiff with a form entitled 
Summit County Affidavit of Primary Residence, which Plaintiff caused to be completed 
and filed. A copy is attached as Exhibit "Blf. [Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, 
18.] 
9. Defendants granted Plaintiff the primary residential exemption for such 
property April 17, 1997. [Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, 11 8.] 
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10. Plaintiff filed a refund request with Defendants for the 1992 through 1996 tax 
years for the difference between the primary residential exemption and the non-primary 
classification. A copy of the $70,182.791 worksheet of tax difference is attached as 
Exhibit "C". [Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, 1f 9.] 
11. According to the Summit County Attorney, the Summit County Board of 
Commissioners, acting as the Board of Equalization, denied the request on August 14, 
1997. [Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, If 9.] 
12. On July 16, 1998, Plaintiff appealed the Board of Commissioner's failure to 
refund to the Utah State Tax Commission. [Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, 
H10.] 
13. On October 6, 1999, the Utah State Tax Commission dismissed the appeal, 
stating that: 
Utah Code Ann., Section 59-2-1327, provides that a taxpayer 
who claims the tax is unlawful can pay the taxes under 
protest, as the Petitioner did for the years at issue, and then 
file an action in district court. 
A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit "D". [Defendants' Statement of Material 
Facts, 11 11.] 
14. Plaintiff filed a Request for Reconsideration on October 15, 1999. A copy is 
attached as Exhibit "E". [Defendants' Statement of Material Facts, U 12.] 
1
 Defendants are correct, the amount is $66,866,90, not $70,182.79. 
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15. On December 8, 1999, the Utah State Tax Commission issued irs Order 
Denying Reconsideration. A copy is attached as Exhibit "P1. [Defendants' Statement of 
Material Facts, 1f 12.] 
16. Plaintiff has exhausted its administrative remedy. 
17. This is an action for refund of taxes unlawfully and erroneously assessed 
which Plaintiff paid under protest annually. 
18. Under Utah Code Ann., Section 59-2-1327 and Section 59-1-301 (1992), a 
taxpayer who claims the tax is unlawful can pay the taxes under protest, as the Plaintiff 
did for the years at issue, and then file an action in district court. 
POINT I 
During all times in question, 1992 through 1996, Bret Anderson resided on the real 
property, qualifying it for the residential exemption. 
POINT n 
Defendants erroneously and unlawfully assessed the real property under the non-
residential classification for the years 1992 through 1996, resulting in taxpayer paying 
$66,866.90 more in taxes than would have been assessed under the proper residential 
classification. 
POINT III 
Plaintiff paid the higher tax each year under written protest, specifically claiming the 
residential exemption under Utah Code Ann. 59-2-1327. 
5 
POINT IV 
In 1997, Defendants told Plaintiff for the first time of their requirement of a "Summit 
County Affidavit of Primary Residence," which Plaintiff obtained and filed forthwith. 
POINT V 
The residential exemption is a Utah Constitutional provision, Article XIII, Section 2 
implemented by Utah Code Ann. 59-2-103, and neither require nor provide for an affidavit 
to entitle a taxpayer to the residential exemption. 
POINT VI 
This matter is not barred by any statute of limitations. 
DISCUSSION 
The primary residential exemption is provided for in Article XIII, Section 2 of the 
Utah Constitution: 
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption 
from taxation: of not to exceed 45% of the fair market 
value of residential property as defined by law. 
Section 59-2-102 Definitions provides: 
(22) "Residential property," for the purposes of the 
reductions and adjustments under this chapter, means any 
property used for residential purposes as a primary residence. 
Section 59-2-103 Rate of assessment of property - Residential property provides: 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed 
at a uniform and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, 
as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law. 
(2) Beginning January 1, 1995, the fair market value of 
residential property shall be reduced by 45%, representing a 
residential exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Article 
XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. 
All of the above is found in Part 1 General Provisions of the Property Tax Act. 
Part 11 Exemptions of the Property Tax Act provides for exemptions but does not 
include the residential property exemption. 
Section 59-2-1101 lists certain exemptions, but not the residential exemption. 
With regards to those listed exemptions (the residential exemption is not listed), Part 
11 provides that the owner who receives those exemptions (the residential exemption is not 
listed), "if required by the commission, shall file an affidavit on or before March 1 of each 
year, certifying the use to which the property has been placed during the past year." "If the 
affidavit is not filed within the time limits prescribed by the county board of equalization, 
the exempt status may, after notice and hearing be revoked and the property then placed 
on the tax rolls." 
Section 59-2-1101(4) provides: 
The county legislative body may adopt rules to effectuate the 
exemptions (the residential exemption is not listed) in this part 
i.e. Part 11. 
Section 59-2-1102 Determination of exemptions by board of equalization - Appeal 
provides: 
(1) The county board of equalization may, after giving notice 
in a manner prescribed by rule, determine whether certain 
property within the county is exempt from taxation. 
Assuming arguendo, that Part 11 someway applies to the Constitutional residential 
exemption, the problem for Defendants is as follows: 
Plaintiff paid the taxes under protest claiming the residential exemption each year for 
1992 through 1996. Not until 1997, did Defendants give Plaintiff any notice of any rule that 
Defendants required an affidavit for the residential exemption 
Due process requires Defendants to give taxpayers notice of an affidavit requirement. 
Plaintiff gave Defendants notice it was paying the full assessed tax under protest. Plaintiff 
notified Defendants that the tax was erroneous and unlawful because Plaintiff was entitled 
to the residential exemption. Plaintiff so notified Defendants in writing as prescribed by Part 
13, Section 59-2-1327, Payment of tax under protest - Circumstances where authorized -
Action to recover tax paid. 
Defendants failed to notify Plaintiff in a manner prescribed by rule about an affidavit 
until 1997. Due process requires Defendants to give Plaintiff timely notice in 1992-1996 of 
an affidavit requirement to defeat Plaintiffs right to reimbursement. If Defendants had a 
rule for an affidavit for a residential exemption in the years 1992 through 1996, they waived 
it or are estopped from asserting it by failing to notify Plaintiff of any such rule under the 
above circumstances. 
Defendants granted Plaintiff the residential exemption April 17, 1997. On April 24, 
1997, Plaintiff requested a refund for the years 1992 through 1997 based upon its payments 
under protest for those years. Defendants claim they denied the request August 14, 1997. 
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Inasmuch as Plaintiff did not receive notice from the board of adjustment or the Summit 
County Commission, Plaintiff requested an appearance before the Summit County 
Commission, but to no avail. On July 16, 1998, Plaintiff appealed to the Utah Tax 
Commission. The appeal ended December 8, 1999. 
Section 78-12-40 Effect of failure of action not on merits provides: 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the 
merits, and the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he 
dies and the cause of action survives, his representatives, may 
commence a new action within one year after the reversal or 
failure. 
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action December 23,1999. Therefore, the action 
is timely (within 4 years) after exhausting Plaintiffs administrative remedies. The applicable 
statute of limitations is Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25. Stevensen v. Monson, 856 P.2d 355 (Utah 
Ct. App), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
This is an appropriate case for summary judgment. There can be no dispute as to 
the facts. The only legal issue defendant raises is whether or not plaintiff is precluded from 
the residential exemption classification for failing to file the "Summit County Affidavit" in 
spite of plaintiff paying the taxes each year under protest in writing, claiming the residential 
exemption. 
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Plaintiff respectfully submits that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \Vfl* day of February, 2000. 
^^WVA^toj 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
MARSDfeNf CAHOON, 
& BELL, LLC 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
TTFREDSON 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to Robert W. Adkins, David L. Thomas and David G. Bayles, 
attorneys for Defendants, Summit County Courthouse, P.O. Box 128, Coalville, Utah 84017, 
this / / ' day of February, 2000, postage prepaid. 
/ /
^ ^ - ' % ^ — -
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SUMMIT COUNT* 
Affidavit Of Primary Residence 
Pursuant to 59-2403 UCA 
I hereby certify that: 
1) The btatjim owner of die following described property (please print name, street address or 
condominium unit number and mailing address).is: 
A. E . , Inc . , a Utah Corporation Seriali BBC-7 
Unit 7 The Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley 
c/o Milo S. Marsden. Jr. 
68 South Main, #500 
Salt lake City, UT 84101 
^jg of Bret Alan Anderson be has 
2) The above described property is ny|xnnane3it,MtimeresidqicyWthafMaw»no 
other permanent residence either in the State of Utah or any other state. 
Date of Occupancy Novenfcer 20, 199Z 
OR 
I am leasing the above described property on a year round basis as of t h e _ d a y of 
,19 . Attached is a copy of the lease agreement and/or below is the 
name and address of the person (s) the property is being leased to who use this property 
as a primary residence. 
I understand that pursuant to Utah Code 59-2-309 (2), that any misrepresentadon of this affidavit 
subjects the owner to severe penalties. 
A.E. Inc . , a Utah Corporator! 
Signed M 
Milo S. Mar; 
Dated February 3 
Submission of this application authorizes the Assessor to request or collect information sufficient 
to verify primary residence status. A listing of criteria used to determine residence status is 
found on the back of this form. 
October 31,1996 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Glen C Thompson 
Summit County Treasurer 
P.O. Box 128 
CoaMDe, UT 84017-0128 
Re: Payment of 1996 Property Taxes Under Protest 
Dear Mr. Thompson: 
A. E^ Ino, a Utah corporation, is the owner of Unit 7, The Bald Eagle Oub at Deer 
Valley. The corporation is sending you a check in the amount of $40,872.00 in payment of 
the 1996 property taxes on the property known as Unit, The Bald Eagle Oub at Deer Valley 
Utah. The account number is 0266118. 
The corporation believes that 45 percent of the taxes assessed against this parcel are 
unlawful and unconstitutional because the property has not been given the benefit of the 
residential property tax exemption that is given to other residential property in the county 
and state. 
Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-2-1327,45 percent of the 
total 1996 taxes due are paid under protest 
Sincerely, 
A. E, INC. 
a Utah Corporation 
By 
r\ r\ ,~| ^ 
1996 Unit 7 
1996 Unit 8 
1995 Unit 7 
1995 Unit 8 
1994 Unit 7 
1994 Unit 8 
WORKSHEET OF TAX DIFFERENCE 
For Failure to Give Residential Exemption 
Under § 59-2.103, Utah Code Annotated) 
$4,216,103 -
644,000 = 
3,488,103 -
560,000 = 
1,641,068 « 
393,750 « 
$48^40.65/ 
7368.65 
44,333.79 
7,117.60 
26,84439 
6,440.96 
x45% 
x45% 
x45% 
x45% 
x32% 
x32% 
" 
= 
ss 
= 
s s 
s s 
$21,708.29 
3315.89 
19,950.21 
3,20192 
8^9027 
2,061.11 
1993 Unit 7 
1993 Unit 8 
1,641,068" 
393,750* 
26,320.85 293-5=24.5% = 6,448.61 
6,31534 293-5=243% « 1,547.26 
1992 Unit 7 443,750* 
1992 Unit 8 393,750* 
TOTAL2 
7,26169 293-5=24.5% = 1,77936 
6,44438 293-5=24.5% = 1.578.87 
$70,18179 
T&xabla Talua for If92 and 1993 vaa 9SI of market ra laa . 
I 39-2-103 
Beginning January 1, 1992, aad avary yaar tharaaftar tha f&ir aaxkat valna of 
raaidaatial proparty thall ba raduead by 29,301, rapraaaatiag a raaidaatial 
allovad aadar Articla XXXI, fae. 2, Utah Caaatitutioa. 
naginning January I, 1994f aad arary yaar tharaaftar tha fair aaxkat ralaa of 
raaidaatial proparty shall ba radacad by 321, rapraaaatiag a raaidantial 
axaaantioa allowad aadar Artlcla XIII, fae. 2, Utah Caaatitutioa. 
aaglaaing Juaa 1, 1993, tha fair aaxkat ralaa of raaidaatial proparty ahall 
ba radacad by 431, rapraaanting a raaidaatial axaaptioa alloaad aadar Xrtiola 
XIII, Sao. 2, Utah Constitution. 
**> r\ r\ r> 
LAW orriccs 
MAX ^ K N , CAHOON, GotrraDSON & _ JLL, LJL.C. 
FIFTH rtoo* 
^ • . M A M O C K ^ ^ j o y ^
 M A | N «roou«. 
c OWOQM. M .
 S A L T L u a CITT. UTAH 6 4 1 0 1 «*"• * * (SOI) 521-3800 
TAX (SOU 337-1315 
April 24,1997 
niMMr 
Summit County Commission 
P.O. Box 128 
Coarvffle, UT 84017 
Re: Bald Eagle Club at Deer Valley, Lots 7 and 8 
Dear Commission Members: 
I represent A.E. Ino, a Utah corporation, which has paid taxes under protest since 
1992 for failure of the Summit County Assessor to grant the residential 45% reduction 
exemption allowed by Article Xm, Section 2, Utah Constitution, and implemented by the 
Utah Legislature as § 59-2-103. 
A copy of the 1997 Assessor's letter granting the exemption is enclosed. 
I am enclosing copies of the 1992 -1996 property tax notices. AH payments were 
made in full under protest by certified mail, return receipt requested. I am also enclosing 
the worksheet of the tax difference, $70,182.79. 
It is respectfully requested that you grant the refund because the properties should 
have received the primary residential reduction, but due to the Assessor's error in 
classification, it was not granted. Therefore, it should be refunded at this time. 
If you have any questions, please give me a call. 
Very truly yours, 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr. 
MSM/gz 
Enclosures 
*"A f~\ .TV ^3 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A.E., INC., ) 
) ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
Petitioner, ) TO DISMISS 
) 
v. ) Appeal No. 99-0257 
) 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, - ) 
SUMMIT COUNTY, ) 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) Judge: Phan 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 20,1999, Respondent filed in this matter a Motion to Dismiss on the basis 
that Petitioner failed to timely file its appeal before the State Tax Commission. Petitioner had 
submitted a Memorandum Regarding Jurisdiction on July 9,1999, and submitted a Response to 
Defendant's Motion To Dismiss and in Further Support of Plaintiffs Memorandum Regarding 
Jurisdiction on August 9,1999. 
Petitioner owns real property in Summit County and for the years 1992 through 1996 
Petitioner was denied the primary residential exemption for such property. For each of these years 
Petitioner paid the tax with a letter stating that the payment was made under protest as Petitioner was 
entitled to the exemption. Petitioner did not file an affidavit, nor provide any evidence that it 
qualified for the residential property tax exemption. In addition. Petitioner apparently did not file 
an appeal of the exemption status with the Summit County Board of Equalization for the years in 
question. For the 1997 tax year Petitioner filed the appropriate application and affidavit and was 
granted the primary residential exemption. Petitioner then filed a refund request with the County for 
Appeal No. 99-0257 
the 1992 through 1996 tax years. According to Respondent's attorney the Summit County Board of 
Commissioners, acting as the Board of Equalization, denied the request on August 14,1997. This 
denial was communicated to Petitioner by letter from Barbara Kresser, Summit County Assessor. 
Petitioner did not file an appeal of the decision to the State Tax Commission until July 1998. 
Petitioner argues that this is not an appeal from an adverse exemption ruling with the 
30 day limitation period allowed under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1102(7). Instead Petitioner indicates 
that this is an action for refund of taxes unlawfully and erroneously assessed which it paid under 
protest annually and Petitioner asserts that it is entitled to bring this action before the State Tax 
Commission under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1328l or §59-2-1321. 
The Tax Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal in either instance.2 
Petitioner did not comply with the administrative remedies of timely filing an appeal with the County 
Board of Equalization annually within thirty days from the date of the property tax notices and then 
timely filing an appeal annually with the State Tax Commission pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. 
^his provision does not support Petitioner's claim as it 
merely details how payment is to be made if a refund is ordered. 
It is presumably read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. §59-2-
1327 which indicates the procedure for obtaining an order of 
refund. 
2See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Tax Com'n, 870 P.2d 291, 293 
(Utah App. 1994) . In Blaine Hudson the court stated, "A taxpayer 
faced with an allegedly erroneous assessment ordinarily has two 
statutory methods of challenging the ensuing tax. First, Utah 
Code Ann. §§59-2-1004, -1005 (1992) provide that the taxpayer can 
file an administrative appeal with the County Board of 
Equalization. Second, Utah Code Ann. §59-1-301(1992) authorizes 
the taxpayer to pay under protest and seek to recover the tax 
paid in an action brought in district court.'' 
-2-
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§59-2-1006. Petitioner's appeal to the State Tax Commission nearly one year later is untimely. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1327 provides that a taxpayer who claims the tax is unlawful 
can pay the taxes under protest, as Petitioner did for the years at issue, and then file an action in 
district court. A similar remedy is provided in Utah Code Ann. §59-1-31)1, which again specifically 
states that the action is to be filed in district court. 
Petitioner also argues that the Tax Commission has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. §59-2-1321. Petitioner is incorrect. This section provides that the county 
legislative body can order a refund for property that "has been either erroneously or illegally 
assessed." The statute, however, does not provide for an appeal of the county's decision to the State 
Tax Commission. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that the Tax Commission does not have 
jurisdiction to review the County's decision on a §59-2-1321 claim and has suggested that the 
appropriate body to review the County's decision was the district court.3 
ORDER 
Based upon the Commission's review of the motion and consideration of the parties' 
positions, the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
DATED this ^ day of J^£^j&£* ^ 1999. 
h ML U-Jaie Phan 
Administrative Law Judse 
3
 See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Tax Com'n. 870 P.2d 291,294 
:i994) . 
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision. 
DATED this A 
lchard B 
Chairman 
AESSm 
R. Bruce Johnson 
Commissioner 
^ day of. 
McKfcown / ^ * C 0 / l f y > \ 
•to? « C A . | \ \ 
'? O C A 
c ' ^ * * 
-Z 1999. 
TZLKV^  J ^ I ^ C L ^ A ^ C Z - , 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commissioner 
41WL WJ-ISUAJO^LJ 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for 
Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a 
Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty 
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§§59-1-601 and 63-46M3 et. seq. 
JKP/99~0257.dis 
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C E R T I F I C A T E O P M A I L I N G 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeal 
A. E./ Inc. 
VS. 
Summit County BOE 
99-0257 
A.E., Inc., 
Petitioner 
c/o Milo Marsden _ 
68 South Main Street, 5th floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Frazier, Blake 
Respondent 
Summit County Auditor 
P 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 84017 
Thomas, David 
Attorney for Respondent 
Summit County Deputy Attorney 
60 N. Main P 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 84017 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document 
addressed to each of the above named parties. 
MELO S. MARSDEN, JR. A2086 
MARSDEN, CAHOON, GOTTFREDSON & BELL, LLC. 
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF 
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800 
FAX NO.: (801) 537-1315 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A. E., INC, ) 
) REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiff ) 
vs. ) Case No. 99-0257 
) (Judge Jane Phan) 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF ) 
EQUALIZATION, ) 
Defendant ) 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 63-466-13, Petitioner alleges the following 
points of law and fact which the Commission has overlooked or misapprehended: 
1. Petitioner did provide evidence that it qualified for the residential property tax 
exemption for the years 1992 through 1996. Petitioner has qualified for the residential 
property tax since 1992. Petitioner paid the 1992-1996 taxes with a letter stating that 
payment was made under protest and that petitioner qualified for the exemption. 
Respondent did not request nor have an affidavit requirement until 1997. Petitioner 
never received from respondent a denial of the refund request. 
2. Petitioner urges the Commission to focus on Section 59-2-1328, which gives the 
Commission jurisdiction in "any action" where a tax paid under protest was unlawfully 
collected. Thus, even if the Commission cannot order a refund, the Commission "sua 
sponte" can adjust County assessments. Yes, we could file in the district court; however, 
the Commission has jurisdiction sua sponte to adjust assessments of the counties. See 
Section 59-1-210. 
3. Lastly, a review of the Utah Constitution, Section 13, Section 2, and Utah 
Code Sections 52-2-103 and 59-2-1100, etc reveals that the residential exemption is in the 
Utah Constitution and in Section 59-1-103. On the other band, the exemptions under 
Section 59-2-1100 etc, which provide for affidavit and exemptions, does not include the 
residential exemption. The residential exemption is self-contained and uses language 
referring to "this part" In short, the affidavit provision is not part of the residential 
exemption. 
DATED this \<&V day of October, 1999. 
Milo S. Ma/Sden, Jr. ( / 
MARSDEfu^AHOO^jOTTFREDSON 
& BEIlJllC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing REQUEST FOR 
RECONSIDERATION to Robert W. Atkins, Summit County Attorney, and David L. 
Thomas, Deputy Summit County attorney, Summit County Courthouse, P.O. Box 128, 
Coalville, Utah 84017, this / P ^ a v of October, 1999, postage prepaid. 
du/fa 'fas^^ T 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
A.E., INC., ) 
) ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION 
Petitioner, ) 
) Appeal No. 99-0257 
v. ) 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF ) Tax Type: Property Tax/Locally Assessed 
SUMMIT COUNTY, ) 
UTAH, ) 
Respondent. ) Judge: Phan 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission upon a Petition for 
Reconsideration, dated October 21,1999, filed by Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final 
order dated October 6,1999. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-29 provides that a Petition for Reconsideration 
"will allege as grounds for reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery of new 
evidence." Under this rule, the Tax Commission may exercise its discretion in granting or denying 
a Petition for Reconsideration. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Upon review of the arguments set out in Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration, 
although Petitioner disagrees with the Commission's final decision, Petitioner did not provided 
information that would indicate a mistake in law or fact sufficient for the Commission to reconsider 
RECEIVED 
npr. 9 1999 
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its final order. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order of the Utah State Tax 
Commission that the Petition for Reconsideration is denied. It is so ordered. 
DATED this - day of / S / ' z * J t * * r ^ / * 4 ^ s . 1999. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commissioner 
x^c^y 
R. Bruce Johnsjari 
Commission^' 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this 
order pursuant toUtah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-46M3 et. seq. 
JKP/9S-C257.rec 
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C E R T I F I C A T E O P M A I L I N G 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Appeal 
A. E . , I n c . 
VS. 
Summit County BOE 
99-0257 
A.E., Inc., 
Petitioner 
c/o Milo Marsden 
68 South Main Street, 5th floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84101 
Frazier, Blake 
Respondent 
Summit County Auditor 
P 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 84017 
Thomas, David 
Attorney for Respondent 
Summit County Deputy Attorney 
60 N. Main P 0 Box 128 
Coalville UT 84017 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing document 
addressed to each of the above named parties. 
/ * / & & 
Date 
Tab 4 
Robert W. Adkins, #0028 
Summit County Attorney 
David L. Thomas, #7106 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
David G. Bayles, #8147 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. O. Box 128 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Telephone (435) 336-4468 
Attorneys for Summit County 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.E., INC. a Utah Corporation, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION; 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT COUNTY 
ASSESSOR; AND SUMMIT 
COUNTY TREASURER, 
DEFENDANTS. 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO A.E., 
INC.'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990600463PR 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
COME NOW the Defendants, The Summit County Commission, The Summit County 
Board of Equalization, The Summit County Assessor, and The Summit County Treasurer, by 
and through their counsel of record, and reply to A.E., INC.'S Response to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Plaintiffs Response"). 
013 
BY-—: 
F I L E D 
FEB I S 2000 
Third District Court <£jt 
Deputy Jo k summit County 
SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
In the factual paragraphs of Plaintiff's Response, Plaintiff expressly admits all but two 
facts. From these statements of fact it is apparent that Plaintiff and Defendant are in 
agreement that: Plaintiff paid property taxes timely on its two units of Deer Valley property 
for the years 1992 through 1996; one unit of the property was improved with a building and 
had .98 acres of land and the other unit was unimproved and had .59 acres of land; and, each 
of the tax payments was paid under protest to The Defendant Summit County Treasurer 
because the assessment each year did not exempt a portion of the property as primary 
residential. 
In regards to the two facts that Plaintiff disputes in Plaintiffs Response, the first is 
really an admission with explanation and the other is unnecessary to the Court's determination 
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Admission With Explanation. 
Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment 
(hereinafter "Defendants' Memorandum"), H5 of the factual statement, reads: "Plaintiff never 
filed an application or affidavit for a residential property tax exemption with Summit County, 
as required by U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), nor did Plaintiff ever provide any evidence that he 
qualified for the residential property tax exemption during tax years 1992 - 1996." 
Plaintiffs dispute is at 15 of the facts in Plaintiffs Response and reads: "Disputed. 
Plaintiff provided its annual letter of protest for the years 1992 through 1996 claiming the 
residential exemption entitlement. Utah Code Ann. 59-2-1102(3) does not provide for nor 
require an affidavit for the residential exemption. If 59-2-1102(3) did apply, 59-2-1102(1) 
requires the Board of Equalization to give notice in a manner prescribed by rule in order to 
determine whether certain property in the county is exempt from taxation. The point is, 
Defendants waited until 1997 to disclose their affidavit requirement [cite omitted, emphasis 
added]." 
From the interplay of these factual statements, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has 
admitted to not filing an affidavit or any evidence that he qualified for the residential property 
tax exemption for 1992 through 1996. But, Plaintiff appears to be explaining that: (1) 
Plaintiffs protest letter qualifies as an application, (2) Plaintiff didn't have to file an 
application by law, or (3) that Defendants' didn't tell Plaintiff it had to file an application. 
Though Plaintiffs "explanations" speak to the matter of law before this Court, Defendants 
may still appropriately conclude that it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not file an application 
for a primary residential exemption pursuant to U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), as to the subject 
property for 1992 through 1996. 
The Irrelevant Disputation. 
The other facts Plaintiff disputes are found at 19 of the parties' factual statements. 19 
facts were only included by Defendants' to complete the procedural picture for the Court and 
do not affect any of Defendants' Summary Judgment arguments. 
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REPLY 
There being no genuine issue of material fact, Defendants may thus appropriately reply 
to A.E. INC.'s Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment by further advocating 
Summary Judgment. Defendants' reply in Point I to Argument "A" of Plaintiffs Response. 
Defendants' reply in Point II to Argument "B" of Plaintiffs Response. Defendants' reply in 
Point III to Argument "C" of Plaintiff's Response. And in Point IV, Defendant's reply and 
comment to the absence of any section in Plaintiffs Response addressing the Statute of 
Limitations-Point II of Defendants' Memorandum. 
POINT I 
In Argument "A" of Plaintiffs Response, Plaintiff again alludes to the argument it 
introduced in ^5 of it's factual statement: that Plaintiffs letters paying the taxes under protest 
were sufficient affidavit or claim upon Defendants for the residential exemption. Or, that the 
letters were, as the heading to Argument "A" suggests, "Notice" to the Defendants sufficient 
for the exemption. Defendants' best reply is colloquial: Plaintiff is "comparing apples and 
oranges." 
Tax payment under protest is solely the mechanism provided by statute to preserve a 
taxpayer's rights to sue for unlawful taxes. U.C.A. §59-1-103. Plaintiff s letter of protest 
alleged that the property was residential, but provided no facts upon which a residential 
character could be determined. (Complaint, Exhibit A). And, Plaintiff made his payment 
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under protest to the Summit County Treasurer, the County official charged with: "receiv(ing) 
all money belonging to the county and all other money by law directed to be paid to the 
treasurer, safely keep(ing) the same, and apply(ing) and pay(ing) it out and render(ing) an 
account thereof as required by law," U.C.A. §17-24-1(1). But, Plaintiff made his payment 
under protest to an official without charge to respond to or in any way administer tax 
exemptions or facilitate taxpayer understanding of exemptions. Plaintiffs payment under 
protest letter is an apple. 
The affidavit of U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) is required to be made to the Board of 
Equalization of the County and it must show, "facts upon which it is claimed the reduction 
should be made." The Board is thereby placed in the position of evaluating and acting upon 
the claims of taxpayers that their property is used for primary residential living. Therefore, 
as compared to Plaintiffs payment under protest letter, the affidavit of U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3), 
is an orange. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants pray that this Court disregard Argument "A" of 
Plaintiffs Response. 
POINT H 
Argument "B" of Plaintiff s Response is titled, "Defendants did not give Plaintiff 
Notice of Any Affidavit Requirement until 1997." On the contrary, Plaintiff has been on 
constructive notice of the affidavit requirement since he began paying his taxes under protest in 
2 
1992. The statute that outlines the exemption affidavit requirement has been effective without 
amendment since 1988. U.C.A. §59-2-1102. 
Plaintiff also suggests in Argument "B" that because the actual words, "residential 
property exemption" do not appear in Part 11, "Exemptions," the Part does not apply to the 
residential property exemption." Defendants'disagree. U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) 
unambiguously states that "no exemption may be granted. . ." unless the application under 
oath requirements have been met. "No exemption" means "no exemption." Longstanding 
rules of statutory construction require this Court to look exclusively to the plain meaning of 
the statute unless the statute is ambiguous; and, there exists no ambiguity here. CIG 
Exploration v. Utah State Tax Commission. 897 p.2d 1214 (Utah 1995) and Epperson v. Utah 
State Retirement Board, 949 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 1997). 
If the legislature intended to limit the affidavit requirements of U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) 
to the exemptions delineated in Part 11, or to except out other exemptions from coverage, then 
the legislature would have proceeded with that level of specificity. But instead, the legislature 
ail-inclusively said, "no exemption" shall be granted without compliance with the stated 
requirements; and, the exemption procedure, applicable to all Property Tax exemptions, 
appears in a logical place-within that Part of the Property Tax Act dealing with exemptions. 
Finally, as argued in Point I of Defendant's Memorandum, the Utah Constitution 
impliedly grants the legislature the authority to regulate residential property exemptions. 
U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) is specifically tailored to that function; and, within the Property Tax 
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Act, U.C.A. §59-2-1102(3) alone is capable of regulating the creation of a residential property 
exemption. As a matter of public policy, the legislature should be deemed to have exercised 
that authority; otherwise, a taxing entity would bear the untenable duty of seeking out 
numerous hidden facts in exclusive taxpayer control to eliminate improper residential property 
exemptions. 
The last sentence of Argument "B" assumes facts not in evidence and is improperly 
raised in the attempted manner. To the extent it is properly raised, Defendants' deny 
Plaintiffs assertion. 
POINT in 
The first paragraph of Argument "C" of Plaintiffs Response responds to Point III of 
Defendant's Memorandum; but, Plaintiffs Argument "C" is contrary to the admissions of fact 
in Plaintiffs Response. In Argument "C," Plaintiff says, "There are factual issues as to what 
areas of the properties are used for residential purposes." But, in \1 of the admissions of fact 
in Plaintiffs Response, Plaintiff admits that one unit of property was assessed with a building 
and the other unit, Unit 8, was assessed as unimproved. Therefore, by the very terms of the 
exemption under which Plaintiff seeks relief from this Court, U.C.A. §59-2-103(2) and 
U.C.A. §59-2-102(26) \ Plaintiffs unimproved Unit 8 fails to qualify as residential property. 
1
 U.C.A. §59-2-103(2) states, "Beginning January 1, 1995, the fair market value of 
residential property shall be reduced by 45 %, representing a residential exemption allowed under 
Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution." U.C.A. §59-2-102(26) states, 
"'Residential property,'" for the purposes of the reductions and adjustments under this chapter, 
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Plaintiff is surely not advocating in Argument "C" that unimproved land can be "residential." 
Therefore, under Plaintiffs factual admission, this Court should grant the prayer of 
Point III of Defendants' Memorandum: Summary Judgment in Defendants' favor declaring 
that the property taxation of Plaintiffs Unit 8 property for all years was not unlawful because 
Unit 8 was unimproved. 
In the second paragraph of Argument "C," Plaintiff correctly responds to Point IV of 
Defendants' Memorandum. 
POINT IV 
No opposition is anywhere logged in Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Statute of 
Limitations argument, and by 116 and 7 of Plaintiffs Response, Plaintiff has admitted that the 
property taxes for 1992 through 1995 were paid on or before November 30, 1995. Therefore, 
in the alternative to Summary Judgment upon Plaintiffs entire claim for failure to establish a 
claim for "unlawful" taxation, Defendants' renew their prayer to this Court to declare that the 
Statute of Limitations bars Plaintiffs claims of unlawful taxation for the years 1992 through 
1995. A copy of Centennial Eureka Mining Co. v. Juab County, 62 P. 1024, (Utah 1900), is 
attached hereto as an addendum for the Court's review and confirmation that Plaintiffs cause 
of action accrued, ". . .[A]t the moment the plaintiff paid the unlawful tax under protest," 
that the Statute ran four years after the tax payment under protest, and that Plaintiff was not 
required to "take any other steps, (like 'exhausting administrative remedies') as a condition 
precedent to bringing (its) action" Centennial. 62 P. at 1026.. 
means any property used for residential property purposes as a primary residence. It does not 
include property used for transient residential use or condominiums used in rental pools." 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants renew the prayer of Defendants' Memorandum 
that this Court grant Summary Judgment in their favor and against the Plaintiff, declaring that: 
1) The property taxation of Plaintiffs property for 1992 through 1996 was not 
unlawful because the conditions precedent to a residential exemption arising in 
favor of the property were not met, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
2) Plaintiffs claims of unlawful taxation for 1992 through 1995 are barred by the 
Statute of Limitations, AND 
i. The property taxation of Plaintiffs Unit 8 property for all years was not 
unlawful because Unit 8 was unimproved, OR 
ii. The property taxation of Plaintiffs property for all years was not 
unlawful as to 57/59ths of the taxation of Unit 8 because only one acre 
of land per residential unit may qualify for a residential exemption. 
DATED this /8 day of February, 2000. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. ADKINS 
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY 
By: 
DAVID G. BAYLES C/ 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
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PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
SUMMIT COUNTY COMMISSION; 
SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF 
EQUALIZATION; SUMMIT COUNTY 
ASSESSOR; AND SUMMIT 
COUNTY TREASURER, 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990600463PR 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
COME NOW the Defendants, The Summit County Commission, The Summit County 
Board of Equalization, The Summit County Assessor, and The Summit County Treasurer, by and 
through their counsel of record, and submit this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
No 
FILE 
FEB ^ 8 2000 
By. 
Third District Court G»fL, 
Deputy "i<j * , Summit County 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
Defendants assert, in compliance with CJA, Rule 4-501(2)(B), that the following disputed, 
genuine material facts exist and preclude the grant of Summary Judgment prayed for by Plaintiff; 
these disputations, however, are immaterial as pertaining to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
1. Defendants dispute all reference in Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum to any factual 
basis that Bret Anderson has resided on the subject property since 1992 as an incorrect 
legal conclusion drawn from Plaintiffs Exhibit B. 
2. Defendant's dispute all reference in Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum to Plaintiffs 
claims to having exhausted administrative remedies, the same being a legal conclusion 
wholly unsupported by express factual reference. 
3. 1117 and 18 of the Statement of Undisputed Facts in Plaintiffs Memorandum are also 
legal conclusions and do not require a response. 
4. Points I through VI in Plaintiffs Memorandum are also legal conclusions and do not 
require a response. 
Otherwise, Defendant's are in agreement that the facts listed in 111-15 of the Statement 
of Undisputed Facts in Plaintiffs Memorandum are undisputed. 
ii 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
Having already motioned this Court for Summary Judgment and having set forth in the 
motion and associated memoranda all the necessary and relevant case law and statutory authority 
for the relief prayed for, Defendants hereby briefly respond to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment as follows: in Point I, Defendants oppose theories in Plaintiffs motion that are different 
from theories that Defendants themselves have previously raised; and, in Point II, Defendants 
oppose the misapplication by Plaintiff of Defendants' previously raised theories. 
POINT I 
There is only one theory that appears in Plaintiffs Memorandum for Summary 
Judgment that has not been previously raised in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment: 
that the residence of Bret Anderson on the property during the disputed years has some 
significance to the matter before this Court. Plaintiff has failed to express anywhere in its 
Memorandum why such a fact, disputed by Defendants, would entitle Plaintiff to judgment as 
a matter of law. Therefore, Defendants urge this Court to disregard the allegation that Bret 
Anderson resided upon the property for the years in question as being disputed and/or 
immaterial to the question of law before this Court. 
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POINT n 
Defendants hereby oppose Plaintiffs misapplication of Defendants' previously raised 
theories. 
The first part of Plaintiff s "Discussion" is Plaintiffs navigation through the provisions 
of the Utah Constitution enabling a residential property tax exemption, a journey which this 
Court has already taken in Defendants' memoranda. And thus, for Defendants' opposition to 
this area of Plaintiffs "Discussion," the Court is referred to Point I of Defendants' 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment and Point II of 
Defendants' Reply to A.E., INC.'s Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Those parts of Plaintiff s "Discussion" referencing U.C.A. §59-2-1101 and -1102 are 
an expansion of Plaintiff s Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Argument 
"B" and, as such, would have been more appropriately raised there. Nevertheless, for 
Defendants' opposition to this area of Plaintiff s "Discussion," the Court is referred to 
previous pleadings-the second through fourth unnumbered paragraphs of Point II within 
Defendants' Reply memorandum. 
Plaintiffs "Discussion" also repeats a prayer for "notice," or due process, found in a 
previous pleading. Defendants again reply: Plaintiff had constructive notice. Also, due 
process is commonly satisfied by a post-deprivation hearing and remedy, which is exactly what 
a "payment under protest" action contemplates. Therefore, Plaintiff is hereby receiving due 
process. 
2 
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And finally, Plaintiff concludes its "Discussion" with a quoted code section, some brief 
argument, another code section cite, and a case cite, all together intended to oppose 
Defendants' Statute of Limitations argument. And all together, upon reading the code 
sections, the brief argument and the case the Plaintiff cites, it is apparent that the parties agree 
that, "The applicable statute of limitations is Utah Code Ann. 78-12-25,*" but disagree as to 
when the cause of action accrues. 
Plaintiff asserts that the cause of action in the instant case accrued when Plaintiff 
allegedly exhausted administrative remedies upon the dismissal of its Utah Tax Commission 
appeal.2 But this belief is wholly unsupported in any law the Plaintiff has provided: Plaintiffs 
quoted code section, U.C.A. §78-12-40, and cited case, Stevenson v. Monson. 856 P.2d 355 
(Ut. App. 1993), both speak only to the applicable Statute of Limitations and neither speaks to 
when a cause of action accrues.3 Therefore, Defendants urge the Court to rule that Plaintiffs 
cause of action accrued upon its payment of tax under protest as outlined in Point II of 
Defendants' Memorandum for Summary Judgment and Point IV of their Reply Memorandum. 
1
 Plaintiffs Memorandum for Summary Judgment, page 9, second to last sentence before 
"Conclusion." 
2
 Plaintiffs Memorandum for Summary Judgment, page 9: at the top of the page Plaintiff 
describes its appeal being dismissed on December 8, 1999 and then after the quoted section, 
Plaintiff mentions exhausting administrative remedies. Note also: Defendants dispute that 
Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies infra. Statement of Disputed Material Facts, 12. 
3
 In Stevenson^ it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to discuss when the cause 
accrued because the tax payment under protest for the five years in dispute was made in one lump 
sum payment. 856 P.2d at 355. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and pursuant to Defendants' own Motion and Memoranda for 
Summary Judgment, Defendants prayer is for this Court to grant Summary Judgment in their 
favor and against the Plaintiff, declaring that: 
1) The property taxation of Plaintiffs property for 1992 through 1996 was not 
unlawful because the conditions precedent to a residential exemption arising in 
favor of the property were not met, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, 
2) Plaintiffs claims of unlawful taxation for 1992 through 1995 are barred by the 
Statute of Limitations, AND 
i. The property taxation of Plaintiffs Unit 8 property for all years was not 
unlawful because Unit 8 was unimproved, OR 
ii. The property taxation of Plaintiffs property for all years was not 
unlawful as to 57/59ths of the taxation of Unit 8 because only one acre 
of land per residential unit may qualify for a residential exemption. 
DATED this / day of February, 2000. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. ADKINS 
SUMMIT COUNTY ATTORNEY 
, . ^ £ 
By: " ^ DAVID G. BAYLES Ls 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
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